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Changing Expectations for Board
Oversight of Healthcare Quality:
The Emerging Paradigm
Tracy E. Miller and Valerie L. Gutmann
ABSTRACT: Within healthcare institutions, leadership is an essential driver
of expectations, performance, and culture.Yet boards of directors traditionally
played a limited role in overseeing healthcare quality, providing final approval
of credentialing decisions but deferring to the medical staff to set standards
for the institution. Case law and standards provide little guidance for board
performance in overseeing quality of care. Recent developments—the availability of comparative quality data, public reporting, and financial incentives for
higher quality—have transformed expectations for board oversight. Enforcement of fraud and abuse laws based on poor quality of care, as well as federal
standards for board oversight of healthcare quality and compliance, have set
higher standards for board conduct. This article examines the emerging paradigm for board oversight of healthcare quality, and recommends how boards
should proceed to meet their responsibilities in an era of comparative quality
measures and transparency.
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Introduction
Healthcare quality depends on leadership as an essential driver of
expectations, performance, and culture. Yet the broad concepts of
fiduciary duty convey little guidance about how boards should undertake this responsibility. Traditionally, board oversight of quality focused
on approval of credentialing decisions—often a pro forma approval of
judgments made by the medical staff.
Recent developments in quality improvement and measurement, as
well as changes in regulatory oversight, have established strong financial incentives for boards to carry out their responsibilities on quality
effectively. Rapid changes in the quality arena—the availability of
comparative quality data, public reporting on quality measures, and payfor-performance—all bring heightened attention and financial pressure
to improve quality. The development of “never events” as markers of
patient safety creates a well-delineated floor for board oversight. The
stakes for increased transparency and public measures of substandard
performance also have been raised by mounting compliance enforcement linking poor quality to false claims, generating the possibility of
substantial financial penalties.
This article examines emerging trends in healthcare quality and the
implications of these changes for board oversight. For an explicit roadJournal of Health & Life Sciences Law Vol. 2, No. 4
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map, boards can now look to guidelines from the federal government for
board actions on quality and compliance; state oversight of healthcare
delivery; and corporate integrity and deferred prosecution agreements
in the healthcare arena. The article assesses the expectations for board
oversight of quality that have emerged in the wake of the transformation
in healthcare measurement and improvement. It compares the quality
oversight responsibilities of boards of healthcare providers with those of
parent boards of health systems and examines the available empiric data
on board activities to oversee quality. The article concludes by recommending steps boards should take to fulfill their responsibilities in an
era of comparative quality measures and transparency.

The Transformation of Quality Measurement
and Improvement
Traditionally, the performance of individual physicians was the primary basis for understanding and evaluating quality. Until the 1990s,
responsibility for overseeing the quality of care in hospitals rested primarily with the medical staff, which functioned through a committee
structure largely independent of the board of directors and management. Through credentialing, peer review of serious errors, and a
medical staff committee structure, physicians engaged in a largely selfregulated process to oversee quality of care. Consistent with this focus
on individual practitioners as the locus of healthcare quality, boards
of directors had the authority to grant final approval of credentialing
decisions; however, in practice, substantive evaluation of physicians
occurred for the most part at the medical staff level. By and large, the
processes to improve care were retrospective and episodic, focusing
on post-hoc analysis of serious events to understand errors made in
individual cases. The roles of the board, medical staff, and executive
management often were coordinated poorly to serve quality goals, with
the medical staff dominating quality oversight by virtue of both its professional knowledge and perspective that quality standards were solely
the provenance of medical expertise.1
1

Legal commentators have criticized the weakness of what has been called the “threelegged stool” of oversight for quality, with responsibility and accountability divided
between the medical staff, executive management, and the board. See John D. Blum,
Feng Shui and the Restructuring of the Hospital Corporation: A Call for Change in the Face
of the Medical Error Epidemic, 14 Health-Matrix: J. L.-Med. 5 (2004); Thomas Greaney, New
Governance Norms and Quality of Care in Nonprofit Hospitals, 14 Annals Health L. 421,
422 (2005); Richard Johnson, Revisiting “the Wobbly Three Legged Stool,” 4 Health Care
Mgmt. Rev. 15 (1979); Brian M. Peters & Jonathan Z. Cohen, Board Quality Oversight:
A “Real World” Systemic Compliance Model, 14th Annual Health Law Inst. (Mar. 2008);
John P. Marren et al., The Hospital Board at Risk and the Need to Restructure the Relationship with the Medical Staff: Bylaws, Peer Review and Related Solutions, 12 Annals Health L.
179 (2003).
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Historically, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care
Organizations (JCAHO, now the Joint Commission) was the primary
external arbiter of hospital quality, apart from malpractice actions.2
Both the federal and state governments rely on accreditation by the
Joint Commission to evaluate the quality of hospital care.3 Only a
handful of states, such as New York, have conducted their own surveys.4
Criticized in the past for emphasizing administrative procedures more
than clinical processes and outcomes,5 the Joint Commission changed
its survey process in 2004 to include additional measures of clinical
quality.6 Although accreditation decisions became publicly available in
1996, survey scores are not publicly released.7
In fact, transparency in quality of care did not exist until recently—
it ran counter to the ethos of a profession accustomed to self-regulation and peer review confidentiality. Boards of directors could receive
internal reports of patient deaths or serious events, but lacked systematic data to evaluate quality. Although malpractice cases escalated in
the 1970s and 80s, they provided limited insight into quality of care.
2

3

4

5
6

7

The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
shortened its name to “the Joint Commission” in 2007. See The Joint Commission,
The Joint Commission Launches New Brand Identity (2007), available at
www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/brand.htm.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approved the Joint Commission
survey as the mechanism to grant hospitals certification to participate in and receive
funds under the Medicare Program. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a), (b), and § 1395x(e); 42 C.F.R.
§ 488.5. In 2009, the Joint Commission’s categories for accreditation were changed;
they are now provisional accreditation, conditional accreditation, preliminary denial of
accreditation, denial of accreditation, and preliminary accreditation. Joint Commission,
Joint Commission Fact Sheets: Accreditation Process Overview, available at
www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/Fact_Sheets/overview_qa.htm;
Joint Commission, Facts About Quality Check® and Quality Reports, available at
www.jointcommission.org/QualityCheck/06_qc_facts.htm.
For example, Joint Commission hospital accreditation is not recognized by New Jersey,
Oklahoma (except for hospital-based outpatient mental health services), Pennsylvania,
and Wisconsin. States Recognizing Accreditation/Certification by the Joint Commission
(Feb. 27, 2009), available at www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/C6A3B227-564E-46E3-A1D8-6CBF5DA6BEE5/0/9_07deeming.pdf. See also State of New Jersey Dept.
of Health and Human Services, Oversight of Acute Care Health Care Facilities, available at
http://www.state.nj.us/health/healthfacilities/hospfines/hfines.shtml.
Molly Coye, No Toyotas in Health Care: Why Medical Care Has Not Evolved to Meet
Patients’ Needs, 20 Health Aff. 44, 47 (2001) [hereinafter Coye, No Toyotas in Health Care].
Donald M. Berwick & Troyen A. Brennan, New Rules: Regulation, Markets, and the Quality
of American Health Care 39 (1995) [hereinafter Berwick & Brennan, New Rules].
In 2009, the Joint Commission will release an update to the Accreditation
Requirements as part of its Standards Improvement Initiative (SII). Joint
Commission Fact Sheets: Accreditation Process Overview, available at
www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/Fact_Sheets/overview_qa.htm.
SII will focus on scores for specific activities that directly affect patient health and
safety. Standards: Facts about Joint Commission Accreditation Standards, available at
www.jointcommission.org/Standards/facts_about_accreditation_standards.htm.
Communication with Joint Commission Communications Office, 3/5/09. The most current accreditation decision for an organization is available on Quality Check, the Joint
Commission’s website, and accreditation histories can be obtained by writing or calling
the Joint Commission. Facts about the Public Information Policy, available at
www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/Fact_Sheets/08_pip.htm.
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By the early 1990s, studies had begun to show that malpractice actions
were closer to a lottery than a fair, equitable way to reimburse patients
for medical harm; the number of actions brought grossly under
represented the rate of medical injury, and patients who did sue often
lacked a valid claim.8 Data on the exceptionally high rate of medical
errors leading to patient death or serious injury began to emerge in
the 1990s, and confirmed that malpractice actions covered only a small
fraction of instances of patient harm from malpractice.9 The number
of disciplinary actions by state governments, like malpractice cases,
encompassed a small subset of physician malpractice.10
The science of quality measurement and improvement first emerged
in the 1970s as an organized field, prompted by government and private payor concerns about the cost of care and studies showing wide
regional variation in utilization of healthcare procedures unrelated to
population needs.11 Seeking to reduce the high rate of medical errors,
researchers sought to apply the model of continuous quality improvement developed by industry to the processes of healthcare delivery.12
In this evolving understanding of quality, systems of care—not individual practitioner error—were both the cause of many serious adverse
events and the potential solution for prevention. Quality experts and
researchers developed measures of processes and outcomes of care
designed to evaluate the treatment provided to individual patients, as
well as the systems of care within hospitals, health plans, and other
providers.13

8

9

10

11

12
13

R. Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study, 325 New Eng. J. Med 245 (1991)
(explaining that malpractice claims are only a rough measure of identifying and
remedying specific problems, and malpractice claims are not very useful as an indicator of the quality of care). One study showed that 98 percent of all adverse events due
to negligence did not result in malpractice claims, and thus, the fraction of medical
negligence that leads to claims is probably under 2 percent.
The Institute of Medicine report, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, was a
watershed in public recognition of the extraordinarily high rate of preventable medical
errors, and the toll of those errors on morbidity and mortality of patients across the
economic and healthcare spectrum. Inst. of Med., To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health
System (Linda T. Kohn, et al, eds. 2000) [hereinafter To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health
System].
Id. A study in the 1990s by the Public Citizen Research Group found that there were
only approximately three thousand disciplinary actions each year (among 584,900
medical doctors), and fewer than 10 percent of those were for negligent or poorquality care.
Prominent healthcare quality researchers noted that healthcare quality problems
could be classified into three categories: underuse, overuse, and misuse, with widespread errors in all three categories. Mark Chassin & Robert Gavin, The Urgent Need to
Improve Health Care Quality, 280 JAMA 1000, 1002 (1998) [hereinafter Chassin & Gavin,
The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality].
Berwick & Brennan, New Rules, at 113–18.
Id. at 115.
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Comparative measures as a precursor to transparency
As early as the 1990s, private payors, including large employers such as
General Electric, regional business coalitions, and government purchasers, sought to drive payment based on quality, or “pay-for-performance.”14
However, public and private payors lacked sufficient market share and
access to comparative measures across hospitals, health plans, and other
providers necessary to effect change. As noted by commentators, the
business case for quality was weak; hospitals and other providers were
not rewarded for higher performance or investment in quality, outside
of capitated systems that could capture some of the savings.15 Moreover,
providers were not penalized for poor performance.16
In 2000, the National Quality Forum (NQF) was created as part of
a concerted strategy by public and private payors to coordinate purchasing power to generate publicly available, reliable measures as a
basis to improve quality, create public transparency, and enable market
choice by purchasers and consumers.17 Over the past eight years, this
coordinated effort, combined with advances in quality measurement
and improvement, has generated comparative measures across three
interrelated dimensions of healthcare quality: patient safety, quality
improvement, and patient satisfaction.18

Patient safety
By the mid 1990s, empirical studies showing the frequency of patient
deaths and serious harm caused by medical error had generated public
alarm about the safety of medical practice. The landmark 1999 report
by the Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human, attributed approximately
44,000 to 98,000 deaths each year to medical errors. Medication errors

14 Tracy Miller & Sheila Leatherman, The National Quality Forum: A “Me-Too” or a Breakthrough in Quality Measurement and Reporting?, 18 Health Aff. 233 (1999) [hereinafter
Miller & Leatherman, The National Quality Forum]. In the absence of data on quality, businesses relied on volume of procedures as a placeholder. Coye, No Toyotas in
Health Care; Fraser et al., The Pursuit of Quality by Business Coalitions: A National Survey,
18 Health Aff. 158 (1999). Private health plans also used quality data as a basis for
choosing which providers would serve in their networks. N.A. Hanchack et al., U.S.
Healthcare’s Quality-Based Compensation Model, 17 Health Care Financing Rev. 143 (1996).
15 Sheila Leatherman et al., The Business Case for Quality: Case Studies and an Analysis,
22 Health Aff. 17 (2003).
16 Berwick & Brennan, New Rules, at 49; see also Inst. of Med., Rewarding Provider Performance:
Aligning Incentives in Medicare (Pathways to Quality Health Care Series) 33 (2006).
17 Miller & Leatherman, The National Quality Forum.
18 The two most important concepts in the evaluation of measurement are validity (or
accuracy) and reliability. Many challenges still exist, including the need for risk adjustment to account for differences in patient conditions, reliability of reporting across
institutions, and the validity of measures to capture quality. See Coye, No Toyotas in
Health Care. However, recent studies demonstrate that challenges remain in accurately
measuring hospital quality. See Timothy Bhattacharyya, Measuring the Report Card: The
Validity of Pay-for-Performance Metrics in Orthopedic Surgery, 28 Health Aff. 526 (2009).
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alone accounted for 7,000 deaths a year.19 Studies issued before and
after the report reinforced the notion of a healthcare system fraught
with risk for patients. Studies showed widespread errors, high rates of
inappropriate treatment that posed risks to patients, and undertreatment that led to patient harm.20 Studies of medical errors spurred
development of patient safety protocols by specialty societies, hospitals,
and quality improvement experts, but did not generate data showing
widespread improvement.21 By 2002, the NQF had developed a list of
“never” events that should not occur, such as operation on the wrong
patient, operation on the wrong site or limb, and death or serious disability associated with a medication error. The list was updated in 2006.22
On April 30, 2008, The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) announced that Medicare would not pay for certain conditions
acquired during the hospital stay, effective October 1, 2008.23 In the
19 To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System.
20 See, e.g., Elise C. Becher and Mark R. Chassin, Improving Quality, Minimizing Error: Making
it Happen, 20 Health Aff. 68 (2001). For example, studies found that medication errors
caused about 10 preventable injuries—one-fifth of which were life-threatening—
to hospitalized patients per week at each of two large urban teaching hospitals
(D.W. Bates et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Events and Potential Adverse Drug Events,
274 JAMA 29 (1995)); twenty-four million Americans inappropriately received antibiotics for colds and other upper respiratory viral infections (R. Gonzales et al., Antibiotic
Prescribing for Adults with Colds, Upper Respiratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis
by Ambulatory Care Physicians, 278 JAMA 901 (1997)); A.C. Nyquist et al., Antibiotic
Prescribing for Children with Colds, Upper Respiratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis,
279 JAMA 875 (1998); and in a group of seven managed care plans, 16 percent of
hysterectomies performed were inappropriate (S.J. Bernstein et al., The Appropriateness
of Hysterectomy, 269 JAMA 2398 (1993)).
21 In response to data showing prevalent medical errors, progress did occur in specific
hospitals that undertook targeted improvement initiatives. See, e.g., Sharon SilowCarroll et al., Hospital Quality Improvement: Strategies and Lessons from U.S. Hospitals,
The Commonwealth Fund (April 2007). See also Yosef D. Dlugacz et al., The Quality
Handbook for Health Care Organizations: A Manager’s Guide to Tools and Programs
(2004); Chassin & Gavin, The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality, at 1001 (“A few
health plans, hospitals, and integrated delivery systems have made impressive efforts
to improve their quality of care, and a number of successes in improving quality for
specific patient groups have been documented.”). However, Chassin and Gavin note
that “many . . . institutions have made little, if any, effort to improve . . . .”
22 National Quality Forum, Serious Reportable Events Transparency &
Accountability are Critical to Reducing Medical Errors, available at
www.qualityforum.org/projects/completed/sre/fact-sheet.asp. The National
Quality Forum (NQF) uses a consensus process with broad provider and
public input to develop its measures. National Quality Forum, Members,
available at www.qualityforum.org/pdf/list_of_members.pdf;
see also National Quality Forum, Serious Reportable Events Transparency &
Accountability are Critical to Reducing Medical Errors, available at
www.qualityforum.org/projects/completed/sre/fact-sheet.asp.
23 73 Fed. Reg. 23,547–52. The final regulation is available at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(4)(D)(ii)(1);
See also CMS, Hospital-Acquired Conditions (Present on Admission Indicator): Overview,
available at www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalAcqCond/01_Overview.asp. The events for
which CMS limits Medicare reimbursement are not the same as the National Quality
Forum’s 28 never events, although there is overlap between the two lists. Some states
have decided not to reimburse for never events: In 2008, for example, Massachusetts
determined that state-sponsored insurance programs would no longer pay
for serious reportable events. Mass. Health Care Quality and Cost Council,
HCQCC Update: Patient Safety (2008), available at
www.mass.gov/Ihqcc/docs/annoucement/update_09182008.pdf. According to CMS,
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wake of the CMS policy decision not to pay for hospital-acquired conditions, private plans embraced the same approach.24

Quality improvement measures
The decision by CMS not to pay for hospital-acquired conditions
followed its initial pay-for-performance initiative based on quality of
care measures for five conditions:
1. heart attack,
2. heart failure,
3. pneumonia,
4. coronary artery bypass graft, and
5. hip and knee replacements.25
In 2000, CMS reported in the Journal of the American Medical Association
on national measures of hospital quality of care for these conditions
by region, informing hospitals confidentially of their own scores compared to regional and national rates of performance.26 CMS reported
that care for Medicare fee-for-service plan beneficiaries “improved substantially” between 1998-1999 and 2000-2001, but the agency still called
for further improvement.

Patient satisfaction
The third dimension of quality measurement and reporting advanced
by researchers, private organizations, and the federal government
relates to patient satisfaction.27 Patient satisfaction measures assess the
patient’s experience of care, seeking to capture broad considerations of
whether patients and their families are treated with dignity and respect
and whether care is patient-centered, i.e., engineered to meet patients’

24

25

26

27

seven states have submitted plans to amend the state Medicaid program to restrict
payment for selected adverse events. DHHS OIG, Adverse Events in Hospitals: State Reporting Systems iv (Dec. 2008), available at www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-07-00471.pdf.
For example, Cigna HealthCare announced on April 17, 2008 that it would no longer
reimburse for these avoidable events when permitted under its hospital contracts.
Mike Mitka, Public, Private Insurers Refusing to Pay Hospitals for Costs of Avoidable Errors,
299 JAMA 2495, 2495 (2008).
Press Release, CMS, Medicare Pay-for-Performance Demonstration Shows Significant
Quality of Care Improvement at Participating Hospitals (May 3, 2005), available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1441&intNumPerPage=10
&checkDate=&checkKey=2&srchType=2&numDays=0&srchOpt=0&srchData=part+d&
keywordType=All&chkNewsType=1%2C+2%2C+3%2C+4%2C+5&intPage=&showAll=
1&pYear=&year=0&desc=false&cboOrder=date.
Stephen F. Jencks et al., Quality of Medical Care Delivered to Medicare Beneficiaries: A Profile at State and National Levels, 284 JAMA 1670 (2000). See also Stephen F. Jencks et al.,
Change in the Quality of Care Delivered to Medicare Beneficiaries, 1998-1999 to 2000-2001,
289 JAMA 305 (2003).
CMS, Hospital Quality Initiatives: HCAHPS: Patients’ Perspectives of Care Survey, available
at www.hcahpsonline.org/home.aspx. See also Picker Inst., About Picker Institute, available at www.pickerinstitute.org/about/about.html.
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personal needs and values. While hundreds of patient satisfaction measures had been available from private vendors and companies, in 1995
CMS launched the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and
Systems Program (CAHPS) initiative to develop a standard set of publicly reported, valid measures that would permit comparison across
institutions. Available now on the CMS website, the measures evaluate
eighteen key aspects of the hospital experience, including:
•

communication with nurses and doctors;

•

responsiveness of hospital staff;

•

cleanliness and quietness of the hospital environment;

•

pain management;

•

communication about medicines;

•

discharge information;

•

overall rating; and

•

recommendation of the hospital.28

Moving to transparency and pay-for-performance
The transparency of quality data has become instrumental in the
evolution of pay-for-performance programs and quality improvement
generally, with clear implications for board duties and accountability
to public authorities.29 Beginning in 2003, CMS offered hospitals a
financial incentive to report quality and safety data.30 In 2005, CMS
established the Hospital Compare website, providing quality data to
spur hospital improvement and promote consumer choice based on
quality.31 The Hospital Compare website provides comparative data
28 CMS, HCAHPS Fact Sheet (CAHPS® Hospital Survey) (Mar. 2008), available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalQualityInits/Downloads/HospitalHCAHPSFactSheet200807.pdf
[hereinafter HCAHPS Fact Sheet]. Similar patient satisfaction measures also have been
developed for nursing home care.
29 Studies have confirmed that publicly reported measures have led to quality improvement. See Peter K. Lindenauer et al., Public Reporting and Pay for Performance in Hospital
Quality Improvement, 356 New Eng. J. Med. 486 (2007); Constance Fung et al., Systemic
Review: The Evidence that Publishing Patient Care Performance Data Improves Quality
of Care, 148 Ann. Intern. Med 111 (2008); Judith Hibbard et al., Does Publicizing Hospital
Performance Stimulate Quality Improvement Efforts? 22 Health Aff. 94 (2003) (making
quality information public results in increased quality improvement efforts). See also
Mark Chassin, Achieving and Sustaining Improved Quality; Lessons from New York State
and Cardiac Surgery, 21 Health Aff. 40 (2002); But see Mark Chassin et al., Benefits and
Hazards of Reporting Medical Outcomes Publicly, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 394 (1996) for a
description of the potential pitfalls with the release of quality data. The data are more
equivocal about the impact of transparency on consumer choice. See note 45.
30 Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment Update (RHQDAPU),
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(B). See also CMS, Hospital Quality Initiatives:
Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment Update, available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalQualityInits/08_HospitalRHQDAPU.asp.
31 The Hospital Compare website is available at www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov.
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from the Hospital Quality Initiative32 and voluntarily submitted data
on patient satisfaction from the Hospital CAHPS initiative.33 Starting in
July 2007, hospitals that collected and submitted CAHPS data to CMS
were rewarded, and those that failed to do so were penalized.34
Pay-for-performance became operational for a defined set of hospital quality measures in 2005, with hospitals incentivized and reimbursed
based on their performance.35 Among the demonstration projects
implemented by CMS, the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration, started in 2003, is one of the most significant.36 Hospitals
scoring in the top 10% for a given set of quality measures received a
2% bonus payment on top of the standard DRG payment for the relevant discharges.37 Those scoring in the next highest 10% received a
1% bonus. In the third year of the program, CMS reduced payments to
hospitals that did not meet a threshold score on quality measures.
In November 2002, CMS implemented public reporting on comparative quality measures for nursing homes with the Nursing Home
Quality Initiative (NHQI).38 The NHQI measures assess nursing home
quality of care, examining specific services such as the percent of
residents given vaccinations (such as pneumococcal and influenza),
and the percent of residents who have pressure sores or urinary tract
infections, who lose too much weight, or who have moderate to severe
32 Numerous other websites also report comparative data on hospital performance
on these and other measures. Among these are the Leapfrog Group, the National
Committee on Quality Assurance (NCQA), and the Health Plan Employer Data and
Information Set (HEDIS). States often have their own public reporting sites, such as the
one operated by California’s Hospital Assessment and Reporting Taskforce (CHART)
program, which publishes its data at CalHospitalCompare.org.
33 Voluntary collection of Hospital CAHPS (HCAHPS) data for public reporting began
in October 2006, and the first public reporting of HCAHPS results occurred in March
2008. HCAHPS Fact Sheet.
34 CMS, Hospital Quality Initiatives: Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment
Update, available at www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalQualityInits/08_HospitalRHQDAPU.asp.
35 CMS, Medicare “Pay-for-Performance (P4P)” Initiatives, available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?counter=1343 [hereinafter
Medicare “Pay-for-Performance (P4P)” Initiatives]. CMS’s Value-Based Purchasing (VBP)
initiatives are intended to continue the transition from Medicare‘s fee-for-service payment systems to a system focused on quality of care. See Medicare Improvements for
Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) § 131(d); US DHHS, Development of a Plan
to Transition to a Medicare Value -Based Purchasing Program for Physician and
Other Professional Services: Issues Paper (Dec. 9, 2008), available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/PhysicianFeeSched/downloads/PhysicianVBP-Plan-Issues-Paper.pdf.
36 In another effort to provide standardized mechanisms to compare healthcare quality,
most HMOs report quality performance data to the National Committee for Quality
Assurance (NCQA) as a basis for quality “report cards.” For a discussion of the limitations
of health plan reports cards for consumers, see Coye, No Toyotas in Health Care.
37 Medicare “Pay-for-Performance (P4P)” Initiatives.
38 CMS, Nursing Home Quality Initiatives: Overview, available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/NursingHomeQualityInits/01_Overview.asp#TopOfPage.
In fact, national reporting of nursing home quality information existed prior
to the introduction of the NHQI in October 1998, with the Nursing Home
Compare website. The NHC website is available at www.medicare.gov/NHCompare.
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pain.39 In December 2008, CMS released quality ratings on its website—based on health inspection surveys, staffing information, and
quality of care measures—for every nursing home in the United States
that participates in Medicare and Medicaid.40 CMS plans to implement
a pay-for-performance demonstration in nursing homes in 2009.41
Not surprisingly, the impact of financial incentives offered by the
federal government has been magnified by the adoption of pay-forperformance by health plans. HMOs were the earliest and broadest
adopters of quality measures.42 A 2006 study found that more than
half of commercial HMOs use pay-for-performance in their provider
contracts.43 Health plans also have extended pay-for-performance to
physicians, provoking controversy about whether publicly released
measures actually assess quality of care or cost savings. In one highly
publicized enforcement action, the New York State Attorney General
sought changes in health plan quality measures to assure that they
reflected quality of care, rather than efficiency or cost savings.44
Taken together, advances in quality measurement and public
reporting over the past two decades create powerful new incentives
for boards of healthcare institutions to focus on quality—direct financial incentives, potential harm or gain to reputation, and the impact
on market share and consumer choice.45 For the first time, boards of
39 CMS, Nursing Home Quality Initiatives: Overview, available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/NursingHomeQualityInits/01_Overview.asp#TopOfPage.
40 CMS, Roadmap for Implementing Value Driven Healthcare
in the Traditional Medicare Fee -for-Service Program 2, available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/QualityInitiativesGenInfo/downloads/VBPRoadmap_OEA_1-16_508.pdf.
41 The Nursing Home Value-Based Purchasing (NHVBP) Demonstration is slated to begin
in summer 2009. CMS, Nursing Home Value-Based Purchasing Demonstration, available
at www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/NHP4P_Summary.pdf. CMS
also has launched quality reporting initiatives across the continuum of care, including
public reporting of End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) measures and physician quality
measures. CMS, End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Quality Initiative: Overview, available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/ESRDQualityImproveInit/downloads/ESRDOverview.pdf.
42 Coye, No Toyotas in Health Care.
43 M. Rosenthal et. al., Pay for Performance in Commercial HMOs, 355 N. Engl. J. Med. 1895 (2006).
44 See Agreement on Physician Ranking Programs between New York Attorney General
Andrew Cuomo and CIGNA HealthCare, available at www.massmed.org/AM/Template.
cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=20295;
Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Announces
Doctor Ranking Agreement with Independent Health (Dec. 12, 2007), available at
www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2007/dec/dec12a_07.html (Independent Health
Association, Inc. agrees to adopt Cuomo’s Model Code for doctor ranking programs).
45 Generally, consumers have not used quality data but relied more on word of mouth.
Judith H. Hibbard & Jacquelyn J. Jewett, Will Quality Report Cards Help Consumers?,
16 Health Aff. 218 (1997). But a more recent study by Hibbard et al. found that consumers will use quality information if the reports are salient and actionable. Judith H.
Hibbard et al., It Isn’t Just about Choice: The Potential of a Public Performance Report to
Affect the Public Image of Hospitals, 62 Med. Care Res. & Rev. 358 (2005). In a major study,
company executives reported that they examine health plan quality data when choosing employee health plans, but few use the data to influence employee choice of plan.
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directors have the data and tools to fulfill their fiduciary duty to oversee quality in a meaningful way, ranging from patient safety to quality
improvement and patient satisfaction. These changes have significant
implications for existing legal standards and government oversight of
healthcare board fiduciary duties.

Board Fiduciary Duties: Standards from Statutes
and Case Law
Boards of directors for nonprofit and for-profit organizations must
meet two basic fiduciary duties: the duties of care and loyalty.46 Boards
of directors for nonprofit entities are held to a third duty: the duty of
obedience to mission.47 These duties are set forth both in case law and
state statutes governing nonprofit corporations.48
The duty of care requires directors to carry out their obligations in
good faith with the degree of care, attention, and skill that a person
in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under the circumstances.49 Judicial decisions interpret this duty to require board
members to make an informed decision and to act in a manner that is

46

47

48

49

M. Rosenthal et. al., Employers’ Use of Value-Based Purchasing Strategies, 298 JAMA 2281
(2007). See also Charles N. Kahn et al, Snapshot of Hospital Quality Reporting and PayFor-Performance Under Medicare, 25 Health Aff. 148 (2006).
For an in-depth discussion of board duties, see James Fishman, Improving Charitable
Accountability, 62 Md. L. Rev. 218, 229–30 (2003) [hereinafter Fishman, Improving
Charitable Accountability]. See also Thomas Greaney & Kathleen Boozang, Mission,
Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 1
(2005) [hereinafter Greaney & Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit
Health Care Enterprise].
See Daniel L. Kurtz, Board Liability: Guide for Nonprofit Directors 85 (1988). However, the
1987 Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act and the most recent edition do not provide
advice or standards on the duty of obedience, nor is the duty of obedience generally
recognized in the case law. See ABA, Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, Third Edition (Aug.
2008), § 8.30(b), available at www.abanet.org/rppt/meetings_cle/2008/jointfall/
Joint08/ExemptOrgCharitablePlanOrganGroup/BlackLetter.pdf [hereinafter Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act, Third Edition]. See also Greaney & Boozang, Mission, Margin,
and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, at 43–44; Rob Atkinson, Obedience
as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. Corp. L. 43 (2008); Melanie DiPietro, Duty of
Obedience: A Medieval Explanation for Modern Nonprofit Governance Accountability,
46 Duq. L. Rev. 99 (2007).
In addition, nonprofit corporations are governed by the mandates set forth by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regarding their tax exemption. See I.R.C. § 501 (c)–(d)
(2004). The IRS rules focus primarily on mission, or in the context of healthcare, the
requirements of the community benefit standard, and the duty of loyalty. In 2007, the
IRS set forth standards that cover board governance.
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, Third Edition § 8.30(b). The newest iteration of the
Model Act has been revised from the 1987 version: the Revised Model Nonprofit Corp.
Act § 8.30(a)(2) called for “care of an ordinary prudent person in a like position under
similar circumstances,” while the Third Edition § 8.30(b) requires the “care that a person
in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under the circumstances.”
For a detailed discussion of the duty of loyalty, see Fishman, Improving Charitable
Accountability, at 233–37.
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not reckless.50 Notably, courts have not held that board members have
a duty to investigate to uncover a problem; board members may rely
on others to provide them with notice or information about a problem.51 The duty of care is shaped by the business judgment rule, which
as a practical matter affords board members broad protection.52 Specifically, the business judgment rule establishes that board members
cannot be held liable for a decision they make, even if the decision
later proves wrong and harmful to the corporation, if the directors
acted in good faith and with the required degree of care.53
The duty of loyalty obligates board members to act solely in the interests of the corporation, and to place the corporation’s interest above
their personal gain.54 Board members cannot enrich themselves at the
expense of the corporation. While transactions between an interested
director and the corporation are not barred, state statutes and case
law require that any such transaction be fair to the corporation, fully
disclosed, and entered into without undue influence by the interested
director.55 The Internal Revenue Code imposes other highly detailed
requirements that bar directors from excess benefit in any transaction
with the corporation.56 Directors who breach the duty of loyalty may

50 Thus, courts are likely to find liability only when the board’s conduct rises to the level
of gross negligence. See Michael W. Peregrine and James R. Schwartz, Revisiting the
Duty of Care of the Nonprofit Director, 36 J. Health L. 183, 190 (2003).
51 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125 (Del, 1963); Model Nonprofit Corporation Act,
Third Edition § 8.30(b).
52 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); Janssen v. Best &
Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 2003) (explaining the rationale behind allowing
the boards of nonprofit corporations to receive the protection of the business judgment rule). See also Ellen W. McVeigh & Eve R. Borenstein, The Changing Accountability
Climate and Resulting Demands for Improved “Fiduciary Capacity” Affecting the World
of Public Charities, 31 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 119, 123–24 (2004) [hereinafter McVeigh &
Borenstein, The Changing Accountability Climate].
53 See Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, at 233 for an in-depth discussion of
the business judgment rule.
54 See Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, Third Edition § 8.30(a)(2). Stone ex rel. AmSouth
Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006), clarified the duty of good faith,
explaining that the duty is breached where a fiduciary acts with a purpose other than
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, with the intent to violate the
law, or where the fiduciary fails to act in the face of a known duty to act. The duty to
act in good faith is not an independent fiduciary duty, but often is considered a necessary element of the duties of loyalty and care, discussed below. See id. at 369–70.
55 Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, at 234–37. In some states, certain transactions, such as a loan to directors, are prohibited. In 2004, 28 states prohibited loans
to directors. Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations 226 (2004). See,
e.g., Not-For-Profit Corp. Act § 716 “Loans to Directors and Officers.” However, a majority
of states limit the personal liability of nonprofit directors, unless the actions are clearly
self-interested, in bad faith, or grossly negligent. See also McVeigh & Borenstein, The
Changing Accountability Climate, at 123.
56 “Taxes on Excess Benefit Transactions,” IRC 7.27.30 (2002). For a discussion of the full
implications of the IRS rules for tax exempt governance, see Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, at 265; Thomas Greaney, New Governance Norms and Quality of
Care in Nonprofit Hospitals, 14 Annals Health L. 421, 426 (2005).
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be held personally liable and may be denied indemnification for legal
fees and cost of the breach.57
The third core fiduciary duty for nonprofit directors is the duty of
obedience: the obligation to act in a manner that preserves the mission
of the corporation.58 The duty of obedience prohibits transactions or
diversion of resources for purposes outside the scope of the corporation’s mission as set forth in the articles or certificate of incorporation.59
In recent years, this duty has come to the fore, as state attorneys general have weighed the conversion of nonprofit healthcare plans to
for-profit status and the closure of institutions.60
While fiduciary duties establish expectations for board conduct,
application of these duties and the broad sweep of the business judgment rule reflect courts’ reluctance to hold nonprofit board members,
most of whom serve as volunteers, to an exacting standard.61 In fact,
legal commentators have noted the shortcomings of fiduciary duty
standards for both for-profit and nonprofit boards as a vehicle to hold
boards accountable and provide needed oversight.62 In the nonprofit
57 Board members may face removal by state attorneys general and criminal liability for
actions that violate federal and state laws. See, e.g. Butterworth v. Anclote Manor Hosp.,
566 So. 2d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). However, the “bar for director liability is quite
high and the range of potential defenses and protection from liability is broad. Indeed,
directors can go about their jobs even in a grossly negligent manner and have no liability, with one caveat: directors must act in good faith …” Gary Brown, Unclean Hands:
As Dangerous in the Boardroom as the Operating Room? Health Law. News 19, 20 (Sept.
2008) [hereinafter Brown, Unclean Hands]. Some states have granted immunity and
mandated corporate indemnification and interim advancement of litigation expenses
for directors from suits arising from affairs of the nonprofit corporation where there is
good faith. Id.
58 See note 47.
59 For examples of cases where the board was held accountable for diverting resources
for reasons outside the corporation’s mission, see Brown v. Mem’l Nat’l Home Found.,
329 P.2d 118 (Cal. Dis. Ct. App. 1958) (corporation’s attempt to dedicate funds to unauthorized purpose led to removal of trustee); Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (articles of incorporation called for operation of hospital,
not establishment of neighborhood clinics).
60 See, e.g., Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1999)
(New York State Attorney General successfully blocked sale and close of Manhattan
Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital (MEETH) based on failure to honor obedience to mission,
but also in part on the board’s failure to fulfill its duty of care in seeking alternatives to
closure and the deal terms negotiated by a conflicted agent).
61 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Tax-Exempt Organizations: Improvements Possible in Public, IRS, and
State Oversight of Charities (2002), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d02526.pdf;
Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, at 218, n. 6.
62 Greaney & Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise,
at 7; Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principles: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit
and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev., 457, 499–500 (1996); Thomas
Boyd, A Call to Reform the Duties of Directors Under State Not-for-Profit Corporation
Statutes, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 725, 745 (1987). Just as failures of governance evidenced by
cases such as Enron and Worldcom called into question the effectiveness of board
standards and public accountability for for-profit companies, the most recent
financial institution failures will no doubt spark renewed debate about the public
accountability of boards of for-profit corporations, especially in light of the extraordinary price paid by taxpayers. For in-depth analysis of past corporate failures,
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arena, the paucity of legal precedents on board duties is compounded
by the lack of transparency, the absence of third parties (such as shareholders) with an interest in overseeing the corporation’s actions, and
the limited resources of state attorneys general.63 While the duty of
mission could serve as an important litmus test for board duties with
respect to overseeing healthcare quality, it has been applied unevenly
by attorneys general and the courts, and has not served as meaningful ballast.64 Although much of the case law delineating board duties
of care and loyalty focuses on financial mismanagement and selfdealing, several landmark cases have established expectations for the
duty of care that have direct application to board oversight of quality,
particularly in terms of the duties to investigate and require adequate
reporting systems.
One of the first notable cases to address board fiduciary duties to
prevent corporate misconduct, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, set forth dicta
broadly protecting board members from liability for corporate or
employee wrongdoing absent explicit knowledge of the wrongdoing or
facts that should have put board members on notice of the conduct.65
In the 1963 case, stockholders brought an action against the directors
for breach of the duty of care in failing to prevent violation of federal
antitrust laws. Specifically, the complaint asserted that the board members had actual knowledge of the wrongful conduct or facts that could
have put them on notice, or in the alternative, were liable for failure
to take action to learn of and prevent antitrust violations. The court
soundly rejected the notion that the board should have put a system
in place to bring misconduct to its attention, stating in what would
become oft-repeated dicta, “there is no duty upon directors to install
and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing
which they have no reason to suspect exists.”66 The court recognized,
however, that board members could be held accountable for ignoring
signs of wrongdoing through willful conduct or inattention to obvious
signs of misconduct.

63

64
65
66

see ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Report of the American
Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility (2003), available at
www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final_report.pdf. See also Eric Dash &
Julie Creswell, Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1 (discussing the poor oversight and lack of risk controls at the bank and its staggering losses).
Legal scholars have described the limited accountability of directors and the weaknesses in a regulatory framework dependent on state attorneys general with scarce
resources to oversee a vast set of institutions. See Greaney & Boozang, Mission, Margin,
and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, at 19, 44–46.
Lamenting the weakness of the doctrine as it has been applied to date, Greaney and
Boozang advocate “mission primacy” as one means to invigorate and inform board
oversight. Id. at 82–84.
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
Id. at 130.
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Eleven years later, the 1974 case of Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National
Training School set a somewhat higher standard for conduct of nonprofit boards.67 A class action brought by patients of Sibley Memorial
Hospital, the suit asserted that board members had breached their
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in the management of Sibley’s
funds. Specifically, the plaintiffs maintained that the board was negligent in managing hospital funds; the Finance Committee did not meet
between 1960 and 1972, during which time the funds were in accounts
that earned little or no interest at five financial institutions. Five of the
hospital trustees held positions of responsibility at the five financial
institutions, leading to the claim of breach of loyalty.
Stating that corporate directors are liable for their negligent mismanagement of corporate funds, the court went on to note that while
trustees often are held to a negligence standard, a director “must
often have committed gross negligence.”68 The court made clear that
a director who fails to acquire the information necessary to carry out
his or her supervisory role has breached the duty of care. The court
also noted that a board member “whose failure to supervise permits
negligent mismanagement by others to go unchecked has committed
an independent wrong against the corporation.”69
In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation addressed the
duties of a board of directors to oversee legal compliance—or as
the court framed the issue, “corporate performance.”70 The suit was
brought by shareholders of the for-profit corporation. They charged
that the board’s failure to oversee compliance with federal anti-kickback laws resulted in significant financial losses to the corporation.
Holding that the board members had not breached their duty of care,
the court pointed to the fact that the board had taken numerous steps
to oversee and promote compliance, including adoption of a policy to
curtail certain payments to physicians, appointment of the chief financial officer to serve as compliance officer, and issuance of compliance
guidance for employees.
The Caremark court noted the difficulty of holding board members of a nonprofit accountable for breach of duty in the absence
of a conflict of interest or self-dealing, but went on to recognize two
grounds for such accountability: (1) a board decision that is ill-advised
or negligent, and (2) “an unconsidered failure of the board to act in
67 Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D. D.C. 1974). It
is useful to note that Stern is unique in that the patients were given standing. In most
jurisdictions, only the Attorney General has standing to pursue board misconduct.
68 Id. at 1013.
69 Id. at 1014.
70 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 961 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented
the loss.”71 Expressly narrowing the broad sweep of the dicta in Graham
v. Allis-Chalmers, the court stated that while boards have no affirmative
duty to conduct investigations to identify wrongdoing, they can and
should be held responsible for assuring that an effective information
gathering and reporting system exists as a predicate for the board to
fulfill its duty of care.72
In 2001, shareholders successfully pursued board personal liability
for failure to act in the face of persistent board inattention to violations
of federal quality standards.73 In In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litigation, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had issued
post-inspection and warning letters beginning in 1993 that informed
the corporation of its failure to comply with quality standards designed
to protect consumers from undue risk. The corporation’s safety failures
were reported in the Wall Street Journal in 1995, and again in the press
in 1999, after Abbott violated its obligations under an earlier voluntary
compliance agreement with the FDA. In ruling for the plaintiffs, the
court pointed to the “sustained and systematic failure of the board to
exercise oversight” over a period of more than six years.74 Given the
egregious nature of the board failure, the case does not establish a
high bar for board conduct; however, the ruling set significant precedent by holding the board members personally liable for breach of the
duty of care in the absence of a conflict of interest or self-dealing. The
Abbott court stated that the board’s failure was tantamount to a lack
of good faith, suggesting that in even in the face of the board’s longterm, serious failure, the court framed its decision in terms of willful
conduct and lack of good faith, rather than relying solely on a finding
of negligence.75 Subsequent cases followed suit, making it clear that
directors who commit gross negligence by failing to take action will be
presumed to have violated their obligation to act in good faith, and will
fall outside the protection of the business judgment rule.76
71 Id. at 967.
72 Id. at 970. However, the court qualified this statement in the context of personal liability, asserting “that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least,
render a director liable . . . .”
73 In re Abbott Labs. Derivative Shareholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003).
74 Id. at 809.
75 Id. at 809.
76 In a decision handed down the same year as Abbott, two outside directors were held
personally liable for approving a transaction despite having no personal interest in
the transaction. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 16415 (Del. Ch.
May 3, 2004). See also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch.
2003) (finding the board’s failure to inquire about conditions and terms of executive
compensation or to review any written agreements constituted lack of good faith
to advance the best interest of the company); Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation
v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). While board members have protection from the
business judgment rule if they decide to take no action after an informed process, the
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Despite Caremark’s recognition of the board’s duty to assure that an
effective reporting system exists, the case law consistently reinforces the
basic demarcation between the duties of the board and executive management; the board oversees the actions of executives, but is not itself
responsible for managing day-to-day operations or conducting investigations without notice of the need to do so. The obligation to manage
operations and senior staff in every realm, including quality measurement and improvement, is a management function. For example, the
board is not responsible for developing a system of quality measurement and reporting, but must assure that an effective system exists and
review the data it generates to evaluate the institution’s performance.

Bringing Quality Within the Purview of Hospital
and Board Duties
As case law evolved to recognize minimum standards for board fiduciary duties, legal doctrines developed to establish hospital liability for
quality, bringing the quality of care within the ambit of hospital board
responsibilities. Until 1965, hospital boards of directors essentially had
no obligations to oversee healthcare quality, except for the duty to use
reasonable care in selecting physicians. The hospital was regarded as a
venue in which physicians provided treatment, rather than as a direct
provider of healthcare services. The 1965 decision in Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital upended that assumption as a matter of prevailing law.77 The plaintiff in Darling was an 18-year-old who broke his leg
playing football. Due to negligent treatment provided by the physician
on call in the emergency room on the day of admission, and thereafter
by the physician and nurses, the plaintiff developed gangrene, resulting
in the amputation of his leg. Rejecting the hospital’s assertion that it had
no obligation beyond using reasonable care in selecting its physicians,
the court stated in what is now well-settled law, “Present day hospitals,
as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than
furnish facilities for treatment.”78
While Darling set a precedent that quickly changed legal expectations and potential liability for hospitals, courts continued to grapple
with whether hospitals should bear potential liability for the actions
protection does not extend to board inaction in the face of notice of a problem. For
further discussion of the distinction between a decision not to act and inaction, see
Brown, Unclean Hands.
77 Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
78 Id. at 257, 332. While Darling involved failure to use reasonable care in credentialing,
later cases have broadened the duties of the hospital board. See Oehler v. Humana
Inc., 775 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1989); Fridena v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463, 466 (Ariz. 1980)
(discussing emerging trend imputing inherent responsibility to monitor overall quality
of care to hospitals).
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of physicians who practice as independent contractors with medical
staff privileges rather than as employees. Since 1976, the courts have
chipped away at the protection accorded hospitals by the notion that
hospitals are not responsible for the actions of non-employed physicians to whom they grant clinical privileges.79 In 1981, in Johnson v.
Misericordia Community Hospital, the court held the hospital liable for
negligence in granting privileges to an orthopedic surgeon whose privileges had been revoked or limited at other hospitals.80 While the case
rested on negligent credentialing, the court cited to Darling and the
hospital’s broader duties to evaluate the care it provides.
Following Misericordia, a long line of cases upheld hospital liability
under the theory of corporate negligence, recognizing that the hospital
owes an independent duty of care directly to the patient.81 In essence,
courts have acknowledged the reality that hospitals have many avenues
to control the quality of care, including treatment protocols, quality
initiatives, and oversight of nursing and other services, as well as the
fact that patients do not distinguish between employed and independent medical staff physicians in their expectations for hospital quality
of care or oversight.

State Oversight and Enforcement
Nonprofit healthcare organizations are regulated by two independent sources of state authority: state attorneys general and public health
departments. Within state governments, the primary authority to oversee nonprofit corporations is vested in state attorneys general, who
have broad authority in relation to nonprofit organizations, including
79 See, e.g., Tuscon Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958 (Ariz. 1976); Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Kitto v. Gilbert, 570 P.2d 544, 550 (Colo. Ct. App.
1977); Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. 1972); Johnson v. St.
Bernard Hosp., 399 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 236 N.W.2d 543
(Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Corleto v. Shore
Mem’l Hosp., 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (all holding that a hospital
has a direct and independent responsibility to take reasonable steps to (1) ensure that
its medical staff is qualified for the privileges granted and/or (2) to evaluate the care
provided).
80 Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d. 156 (Wis. 1981).
81 Oehler, 775 P.2d at 1272 (hospital and governing board may be liable for failure to
supervise treatment by non-employed physicians under corporate negligence theory
of liability); Insinga v. Labella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fl. 1989) (recognizing the corporate negligence doctrine as the independent duty the hospital owes to patients, and
finding that because the hospital is in “a superior position to supervise and monitor physician performance,” it is “the only entity that can realistically provide quality
control.”); Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982) (hospital held liable under
the doctrine of corporate negligence where independent contractors negligently performed pediatric surgery at the hospital); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984)
(expressly adopting corporate negligence theory); Zambino v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa.,
No. 06-3561 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (discussing application of corporate negligence to hospital
trustees); Carter v. Hucks-Folliss, 505 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. 1998) (negligent credentialing).
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management of assets, fulfillment of mission, and closure.82 Through
licensure and regulation, state health departments directly oversee the
quality of healthcare delivered in a wide array of settings, and by extension have authority to set standards and to sanction boards of directors
for failure to oversee quality.

Oversight by state attorney general offices
In the wake of scandals entailing financial management, failure to
fulfill mission, and self-dealing in the late 1990s, state attorneys general
became more proactive in overseeing nonprofit boards.83 By and large,
state attorneys general have continued to focus on mismanagement
and self-dealing by nonprofit boards. Accordingly, in the healthcare
arena, state attorneys general have intervened primarily in matters outside the purview of healthcare quality, such as conversion to for-profit
status, closure, and merger of facilities.84
In the most extreme cases, state attorneys general have the authority to sanction or remove board members. In a 1999 case involving
Allina Health System, the Minnesota Attorney General asserted that
the structure of Allina Health System, which included entities that provided health services and health insurance, led to conflicting missions
between the HMO (“to manage health costs and control premiums”)
and the hospitals (to “act as caregivers to patients”).85 He petitioned for
the authority to appoint the board of a new entity, effectively removing
the Allina board members for conflict of interest.

82 Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, at 265.
83 James Fishman describes a number of the most prominent cases of nonprofit scandals.
Id. at 219. For examples of nonprofit scandals, see Bruce Lambert, New York Regents
Oust 18 Trustees from Adelphi U., N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1997, at A1; Aramony v. United Way,
28 F. Supp. 2d 147, 152–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The
Charities; In Congress, Harsh Words for Red Cross, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 2001, at B1 (in 2001,
the American Red Cross was accused of keeping over $264 million in charitable donations it received for September 11 victims in reserve); John J. Goldman, Charity Ex-Chief
Admits to Theft, L.A. Times, July 4, 2002, at A12 (in 2002, the director of Hale House, a
charity that provides shelter for babies of drug-addicted mothers, stole approximately
$700,000 from the charity); Samuel P. King & Randall W. Roth, Broken Trust: Greed,
Mismanagement, and Political Manipulation at America’s Largest Charitable Trust (University
of Hawaii Press, 2006). See also Kathleen Boozang, Does an Independent Board
Improve Nonprofit Corporate Governance?, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 83, 83 (2007).
84 Thomas Greaney, New Governance Norms and Quality of Care in Nonprofit Hospitals,
14 Annals Health L. 421, 423–44 nn. 8–12 (2005) [hereinafter Greaney, New Governance
Norms] (discussing increased activism by state attorneys general). In one significant
case, New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo launched an investigation in
2007 into physician-ranking programs by health plans, asserting that the rankings
could mislead consumers by confusing quality with efficiency or cost savings. See
discussion, note 44.
85 For a discussion of the Allina case, see Elizabeth Stawicki, Medica Case
Could Test Attorney General’s Power over Nonprofits (Aug. 16, 2005), available at
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/08/16_stawickie_medicahatc/
[hereinafter Stawicki, Medica Case Could Test Attorney General’s Power over Nonprofits].
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The Allina case, as well as other actions to sanction or remove nonprofit board members, demonstrate the significant authority state
attorneys general can exercise in relation to nonprofit boards.86 Indeed,
states are much closer to healthcare institutions than the federal government; they oversee fewer institutions and are more knowledgeable
about institutional leadership and the communities served. Despite
the fact that state attorneys general are often in the most suitable position to oversee execution of the duties of care and loyalty, their efforts
are hampered by limited resources.87 On issues posed by healthcare
quality, state attorneys general lack the expertise of state public health
authorities and CMS.

Oversight by state public health agencies
States’ public health agencies generally have authority to prescribe
and enforce measures for hospital compliance with minimum quality
standards. This authority rests in their control of licensure for healthcare institutions.88 The primary mechanism for oversight is surveys.89
Most states rely on Joint Commission surveys to evaluate hospital quality, but some conduct their own surveys. In addition to state surveys,
many states have established incident reporting systems as a mechanism
to track and respond to adverse events.90 By January 2008, twenty-six
states had implemented adverse event reporting systems; twenty-three
of those had established their own lists of reportable events, while the
other three used the NQF’s list of never events.91
86 Greaney, New Governance Norms, at 424; See Stawicki, Medica Case Could Test Attorney
General’s Power over Nonprofits. In a non-healthcare setting in 1997, the New York State
Board of Regents dismissed 18 of 19 trustees at Adelphi University for improper oversight of the university’s president. Bruce Lambert, New York Regents Oust 18 Trustees
from Adelphi U., N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1997, at A1.
87 Greaney & Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise,
1, 4. See also Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, at 268 (“It has long been
demonstrated that state attorney general offices have neither the person-power,
nor sometimes the will, to monitor nonprofits effectively.”).
88 Most states rely on Joint Commission licensure standards and often accept such
accreditation as the basis for a license.
89 However, recent findings demonstrate the infrequency of such surveys. In February
2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) criticized CMS’s oversight of
Medicare and Medicaid participating facilities, finding the time between surveys for
facilities without statutory survey frequencies too long, which can increase the risk
for quality problems. For example, as of September 30, 2007, approximately 2700
facilities (thirteen percent) had not been surveyed in six years or more. GAO Report to
Congressional Requesters, Medicare and Medicaid Participating Facilities: CMS Needs to Reexamine
its Approach for Funding State Oversight of Health Care Facilities 27, GAO-09-64, Feb. 2009,
available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d0964.pdf. CMS also found that twenty‑five
percent or more of some nursing home surveys in seven states missed serious
deficiencies. Id. at 14.
90 See DHHS OIG, Adverse Events in Hospitals: State Reporting Systems, App. D and E
(Dec. 2008), available at www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-07-00471.pdf.
91 See id. at App. D for a list of the states, the year each state implemented its system, the
agency receiving the reports, the reportable event list the states use, and the number
of adverse events reported in each state in 2006.
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Most states that collect adverse event data (twenty-three of the
twenty-six) use the information to hold hospitals accountable, although
state reporting has been inconsistent and varied.92 State public health
authorities conduct administrative reviews of data, and in the most
serious cases can use the data to support a decision to revoke a hospital’s
license.93
As part of the public health oversight framework, states set standards
for hospital and healthcare system boards. Most states set general standards for hospital boards; they do not delineate how the boards should
fulfill the obligation to oversee quality, although most recognize the
longstanding premise that the board has “ultimate responsibility”
for quality. In many states, boards must credential medical staff and
appoint the chief executive officer (CEO).
Besides these rather general standards, regulation of board oversight of healthcare quality varies state-to-state. For example, the New
Jersey Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS) Code
requires that “[t]he hospital shall have an established and functioning governing body responsible for establishing hospital-wide policy,
adopting bylaws, maintaining quality of care, and providing institutional
management and planning.”94 California law is unambiguous in vesting authority over quality of care in the board of directors, but it does
not delineate how the board should implement this responsibility. The
law requires hospitals to ensure that the medical staff is responsible to
the governing body “for the adequacy and quality of the medical care
rendered to patients in the hospital.”95
New York’s law is more explicit.96 The New York Code states that the
governing body is “legally responsible for the quality of patient care services,
for the conduct and obligations of the hospital as an institution and for
92 Id. at 14. See also Modern Healthcare, Variation Seen in Adverse-Event Reporting
(Dec. 16, 2008) (“Of the 26 states that operated event-reporting systems, 15 said
hospitals don’t always report their adverse events, although all 26 states do use
the information they collect in similar ways to improve patient safety”), available at
www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20081216/REG/312169976. In addition, in many
states, healthcare providers must report to the state when healthcare professionals
commit egregious errors. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2803-e, “Reporting incidents
of possible professional misconduct; N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-l(1–2).
93 However, as explained by public health staff in one state, “revocation could occur only
after the hospital conducted an inadequate investigation of an event that was deemed
‘serious,’ did not develop an appropriate corrective action plan, failed to correct statecited deficiencies, and was in the process of losing or had already lost its accreditation
status.” DHHS OIG, Adverse Events in Hospitals: State Reporting Systems at 15 (Dec. 2008),
available at www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-07-00471.pdf.
94 N.J. Admin. Code. § 8:43G-5.1(b), emphasis added.
95 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 22 § 70703(a), “Organized Medical Staff.”
96 The New York Department of Health has the “central, comprehensive responsibility
for development and administration of the state’s policy with respect to hospital and
related services” due to the significance of providing health-related service “of the
highest quality.” N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2800 (2008).
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ensuring compliance with all Federal, State and local laws.”97 The bylaws
adopted by the governing body must specify how it and the medical staff
interact, and how the governing body holds the medical staff accountable for its obligations to the community.98 New York law also requires
that the governing body maintain “a coordinated program which integrates the review of activities of all hospital services for the purpose of
enhancing the quality of patient care and identifying and preventing
malpractice.”99 Like most states, New York requires the governing body
to make the final decision to credential medical staff members and to
appoint a medical director accountable to the governing body.100
States exercise oversight of board members in various ways, although
generally there has been little discipline for poor quality of care by state
attorneys general or public health agencies. Despite their disinclination
to do so, states can impose penalties for board failures, although the
most common penalty is a civil monetary penalty or fine imposed on
the healthcare institution, not on the board members personally.101 For
example, in 2007, California regulators imposed a $3 million fine on
the nation’s largest nonprofit health plan for failure to provide adequate oversight of quality assurance programs, particularly with respect
to patient complaint management.102 New Jersey adopted regulations
in 2005 setting forth required periodic training for board members,
including training on healthcare quality.103 In addition, the NJ DHHS
may cite a hospital for a deficiency or impose monetary penalties,
including for failure to have a functioning governing body responsible
for maintaining quality of care. Legislation introduced in 2008 created
an “Early Warning System” which provides the NJ DHHS with addi-

97 N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 10 § 405.2(a) (2008): “Governing Body,” emphasis added. See
generally N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 10 § 82.1-5 (2008) “Governing Body.”
98 “The bylaws shall specify at least the following: “…the relationships and responsibilities
of the governing body, hospital administration, and the medical staff, and the mechanism established by the governing body for holding such parties accountable.”
(10 NYCRR § 405.2(b)(4)(iv)). The governing body shall “ensure the medical staff
is accountable to the governing body for the quality of care provided to patients.”
10 NYCRR § 405.2(e)(10), emphasis added.
99 N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 10 § 405.2(b)(6).
100 N.Y. Comp. R. & Reg. tit. 10 § 405.2(e)(1)–(3).
101 State attorneys general have the authority to correct noncompliance of nonprofit
corporations. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 5250 (1990) (“Proceedings to correct noncompliance” for nonprofit corporations: “Attorney General may institute, in the name of the
state, the proceeding necessary to correct the noncompliance or departure”).
102 See Barbara Ostrov, Kaiser Fined $3M for Poor Response, San Mateo County Times, July
28, 2008). The fine was due to “haphazard investigations into patient complaints and
physician performance.” Briefs, Denver Rocky Mountain News, July 27, 2007.
103 N.J. Admin. Code § 8:43G-5.22(b)(2), “General Hospital Governing Body Training,” available at www.nj.gov/health/healthfacilities/documents/ac/njac43g_hoslicstd.pdf (“The
trustee training program shall consist of at least seven hours of instruction and address
each of the following subjects: . . . The role of the governing body in improving health
care quality and the mechanisms available for doing so”).
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tional oversight over the state’s hospitals.104 The bill lays out a system
of progressive monitoring, with each subsequent step taken only if the
hospital has neglected to take ameliorative action.105
In New York, if individuals serve on boards with a poor record of
quality of care, they can be effectively barred from serving on the board
of newly created entities. Newly created entities or those undergoing
significant reorganization must apply for approval to the New York
State Public Health Council, and as part of this process, all proposed
board members must be approved for “character and competence.”106
More specifically, to demonstrate their character and competence to
serve on a board of a newly created entity, potential board members
must disclose all previous boards on which they have served. The New
York State Public Health Council reviews those entities, in and out of
state, for quality and compliance deficiencies.

Federal Oversight of Healthcare Quality
Traditionally, the federal government exercised its responsibility to
oversee quality with administrative surveys and sanctions, managed by
CMS as the federal payor for healthcare. More recently, prosecution by
the United States Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Department of Justice have played an increasing role in federal oversight, as
prosecutors have turned to enforcement of the False Claims Act (FCA)
as a primary tool in combating poor quality of care. Moreover, under
the Balanced Budget Act of 2005, states have financial incentives to
pursue FCA enforcement. As a result, deferred prosecution and corporate integrity agreements have proliferated as a means to demand better
performance of both institutions and the boards that oversee them.
104 Interview with Matt D’Orio, Deputy Comm’r, Senior Servs. & Health Sys.,
Feb. 11, 2009 [hereinafter Interview with Matt D’Orio]; S. B.1796,
Assem. B. A2608 (N.J. 2008), see Press Release, State of N.J. Office of the Governor,
Governor Corzine Signs Hospital Reform Legislation (Aug. 8, 2008), available at
www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/2008/approved/20080808.html.
105 The more interventionist steps include: (1) the Commissioner of Health meets with
the board of directors; (2) the agency assigns consultants to participate in hospital
board meetings; and (3) NJ DHHS appoints a monitor with the authority to override
board decisions. Although NJ DHHS has not yet taken the most extreme of these steps,
the agency has required organizations to create “management action plans” and has
threatened further action which has led to quality improvement. New Jersey has not
imposed sanctions for breach of fiduciary duty on any particular board members.
In one instance, NJ DHHS sought relief from the State Attorney General, but no
action was taken. Id. A list of New Jersey enforcement actions is available at
http://nj.gov/health/healthfacilities/hospfines/summaries.shtml#bar043007.
106 See 10 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. § 600.2(b)(2)(i)–(iii), “Requirements for Approval” (“The
applicant must satisfactorily demonstrate to the council: that there is a public need for
the facility or the proposed new facility; … if a nonprofit corporation, that the members of the board of directors and the officers of the corporation are of such character,
experience, competence and standing as to give reasonable assurance of their ability
to conduct the affairs of the corporation in its best interests and in the public interest
and so as to provide proper care for the patients or residents to be served by the facility or the proposed facility”).
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CMS standards
At the federal level, CMS has authority to set standards for hospital
boards of directors as part of the Hospital Conditions of Participation (COP) in the Medicare programs. CMS standards established for
boards of directors to date relate solely to the boards’ traditional role
in overseeing the medical staff and granting final approval of medical staff credentials. Beginning in 1998, CMS set minimum health
and safety standards for hospitals and providers to attain Medicare or
Medicaid certification. In 2003, Medicare changed the COP standards
to require hospitals to develop, implement, and maintain data-driven
quality assessment and performance improvement programs, but did
not include specific standards for boards of directors.107 However,
institutions may be cited and penalized by CMS for a broad array of
violations, including the failure of governance oversight.
Joint Commission accreditation is deemed sufficient to meet the
requirements for Medicare participation and reimbursement.108 Like
state statutes, the Joint Commission Leadership Standards vest ultimate
responsibility for patient safety and quality in the governing body.109
Among other requirements, the Joint Commission standards require
leadership to:
1. address conflicts among the leadership that could affect safety
or quality;
2. create a culture of safety and quality, encourage teamwork, and
provide education about quality to hospital employees;

107 42 C.F.R. § 482.21 (2003); 42 C.F.R. § 488.5; 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a),(b), and § 1395x(e).
While CMS has authority to oversee hospital quality of care, it often does not actively
do so, instead delegating compliance with such standards to the states. It has been
argued that the federal government has been unable, “at a ground level,” to ensure
quality of care. John P. Marren et al., The Hospital Board at Risk and the Need to Restructure the Relationship with the Medical Staff: Bylaws, Peer Review and Related Solutions, 12
Annals Health L. 179 (2003).
108 Joint Commission Resources, Getting the Board on Board: What Your Board Needs to
Know about Quality and Patient Safety 28 (2007). See also Michelle Mello et al., Fostering
Rational Regulation of Patient Safety, 30 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 375, 382 (2005). See also
Donald M. Berwick & Troyen A. Brennan, New Rules: Regulation, Markets, and the Quality
of American Health Care 43 (1995) (“Just as the federal government has accepted the
role of third-party administrators in Medicare financing, so too has it been willing to go
along with the traditional method of overseeing hospital quality.”).
109 Joint Commission Standard LD.01.03.01. See The Joint Comm’n, Accreditation Program:
Hospital Leadership (2008), available at www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/
D53206E8-D42B-416B-B887-491B6D5AA163/0/HAP_LD.pdf [hereinafter Accreditation
Program: Hospital Leadership]. The standards also clarify that the governing body is
responsible for providing the resources required to maintain safe, quality care, treatment, and services. JCAHO Medical Staff Standard 2 states that a medical staff should
develop and adopt bylaws and rules and regulations as both a framework for self-governance and as a framework for “accountability to the governing body.” JCAHO Medical
Staff Standard 2.
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3. use data to improve the safety and quality of care, treatment,
and services; and
4. establish structures and processes that focus on safety and
quality.110
The Joint Commission also encourages the reporting of “sentinel
events” that require immediate investigation and response.111 It should
be noted that although Joint Commission standards provide specific
steps to promote the safety and quality of care within hospitals, the
standards do not delineate responsibility between the three elements
of leadership: the board, medical staff, and senior management.

Federal enforcement on quality
As healthcare quality has gained prominence in the public eye, it also
has become the focus of mounting attention and action by government
enforcement agencies.112 Armed with data that is publicly reported or
mined from the government’s Medicare and Medicaid databases, the
United States Department of Justice, the OIG, and state attorneys general have pursued healthcare providers for poor quality of care as a
violation of the FCA. In addition to Medicare and Medicaid databases,
federal and state prosecutors seeking to target quality of care investigations may examine data publicly reported on hospital and nursing
homes, state adverse events reporting systems data, and sentinel events
reported to the Joint Commission.113 Under the Recovery Audit Con110 Accreditation Program: Hospital Leadership.
111 Joint Commission, Sentinel Events, available at
www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/ (“A sentinel event is an unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof.”).
The Joint Commission makes a point of distinguishing between “sentinel events” and
“medical errors.” See also Joint Commission, Sentinel Event Policy and Procedures, available at www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/PolicyandProcedures/se_pp.htm.
The Joint Commission sets forth specific requirements for an organization
or hospital reporting a sentinel event. If the hospital or organization
does not follow up as required, the Commission can deny accreditation.
The Joint Commission collects and aggregates data from the review
of sentinel events, but makes only the statistics, not individual cases, public.
112 See Alice Gosfield & James Reinertsen, Avoiding Quality Fraud, Trustee pp.12–15 (Sept.
2008) [hereinafter Gosfield & Reinertsen, Avoiding Quality Fraud]. As reported by
Gosfield and Reinertsen, James Sheehan, former federal prosecutor and now New York
State Medicaid Inspector General, asserted that the federal government will pursue
boards of directors for poor quality under the FCA, and enumerated four questions
that will direct the government’s inquiry: (1) Has there been a systemic failure by
management and the board to address quality issues? (2) Has the organization made
false reports about quality or failed to make mandated reports? (3) Has the organization profited from ignoring poor quality or ignoring providers of poor quality? (4) Have
patients been harmed by poor quality or given false information about quality? Id. at 3.
113 CMS is using a variety of sources in its datamining efforts, including data from the Hospital Quality Initiative and the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative. For a fuller discussion
of these sources, see Cheryl Wagonhurst et al., The Quality of Care Cerberus: Payments,
Public Reporting and Enforcement, 20 Health Law. *3 (Dec. 2007) [hereinafter Wagonhurst et al., The Quality of Care Cerberus]. State attorneys general use the Medicaid
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tractor (RAC) Program, CMS pays contractors a percentage of the
overpayments contractors identify from their examination of Medicare
claims submitted by healthcare facilities, physicians, and suppliers.114
The sanctions for violations of the FCA range from exclusion from federal and state healthcare programs to stiff monetary penalties; violation
of the FCA may encompass criminal as well as civil penalties.115
In the compliance context, providers generally have been found
liable for substandard quality of care under the FCA based on one of
two theories: (1) the treatment billed for was medically unnecessary
or (2) the quality of care was so poor that the services were essentially
not delivered or worthless.116 In addition, the government has pursued
enforcement actions against hospitals for failure to properly oversee
and credential the quality of medical staff, and for violation of regulations, such as limitations on use of physical restraints.117
In quality enforcement actions under the FCA, the government
asserts that the claim submitted for reimbursement was fraudulent. Each

114

115

116

117

database. For example, the New York State Medicaid Inspector General uses the New
York State Medicaid data for audits, investigations, and enforcement. Presentation by
Jim Sheehan, Medicaid Inspector General, Data Mining in Health Care Compliance and
Regulation, Seton Hall Law (June 4, 2008). CMS recently established “zone program
integrity contractors” (ZPICs) that use databases to identify high risk areas, examine
billing trends and patterns to target abnormal Medicare billing, and generally pursue
fraud in a more aggressive manner. Press Release, CMS, CMS Enhances Program Integrity Efforts to Fight Fraud, Waste and Abuse in Medicare, Oct. 6, 2008, available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=3291&intNumPerPa.
The Deficit Reduction Act § 6031 provided a compliance enforcement incentive
to states, specifying that if a state’s false claims legislation meets certain federally
mandated standards, the state is entitled to a ten percent increase of the amount
recovered in a false claims case brought under the state’s false claims act.
Joan H. Krause, Healthcare Fraud and Quality of Care: A Patient-Centered Approach, 37 J.
Health L. 161 (2004) [hereinafter Krause, Healthcare Fraud and Quality of Care]. However,
some commentators have noted that the FCA may not be the optimal mechanism for
enforcing healthcare quality because of its haphazard and sometimes counterproductive application. See Michael E. Clark, Whether the False Claims Act is the Proper Legal
Tool for the Government to Use for Improving the Quality of Care in Long-Term Care Facilities, 15 Health Law. 1, 12; 16 (2002). See also Robert Salcido, The Government’s Increasing
Use of the False Claims Act Against the Health Care Industry, 14 J. Legal Med. 457 (Dec.
2003) for a detailed history of the use of the FCA against the healthcare industry and
relevant case law.
See, e.g., United States v. NHC Health Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (W.D. Mo. 2001). See
also John T. Brennan, Jr. & Michael W. Paddock, Limitations on the Use of the False Claims
Act to Enforce Quality of Care Standards, J. Health & Life Sciences L. 37, 48 (Oct. 2008)
(“Substandard care may be so extreme as to lead to factually false claims, or claims
for worthless services. Use of the FCA to punish such transgressions is appropriate.
These cases are not based upon theories of false certification, however.”).
For example, Central Montgomery Hospital in Pennsylvania was accused of improper
use of restraints and knowingly billing federal healthcare programs for care provided
to the inappropriately restrained patients in violation of the FCA. The hospital agreed
to pay the federal government $200,000 and hire an independent consultant to review
the hospital’s restraint use policies. Press Release, U.S. D.O.J., U.S. Attorney’s Office
Reaches Agreement with Hospital to Resolve Failure of Care Allegations Stemming
from Improper Use of Patient Restraints (July 25, 2005), available at www.usdoj.gov/
usao/pae/nursing/cmmc.html.
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time a hospital or nursing home submits a claim, it must certify compliance with government statutes and regulations that are a precondition
for payment, including the requirement that the care is medically necessary and appropriate. A false certification may be either express or
implied.118 The implied certification theory has been more controversial, and has not been accepted by courts in all jurisdictions.119
Government enforcement actions have resulted in substantial penalties for healthcare providers. Under the FCA, courts can impose
fines from $5,000 to $10,000 per claim, and a penalty of three times
the value of each service that was fraudulently billed. The government can recover for claims brought within six years of the date on
which a violation was committed, or within three years of the date on
which the government knew or should have known that a violation was
committed.120 DOJ reported FCA settlements and judgments totaling
$3.1 billion in 2006, over 70 percent of which was attributed to healthcare case settlements, and $1.34 billion in settlements in 2008.121
For the past decade, enforcement of substandard quality of care has
been a priority for the OIG, which can pursue administrative remedies,
including exclusion from the Medicare program.122 In 2000, the OIG
118 See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 698–99 (2d Cir. 2001); Harrison v. Westinghouse
Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 786 (4th Cir. 1999). See also Krause, Healthcare Fraud
and Quality of Care. Express false certification occurs when the statute or regulation
by its terms requires certification of compliance and establishes that compliance is a
prerequisite for payment. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697–98. An implied false certification claim
is based on the premise that submitting the claim implies compliance with statutes
and regulations that the government would perceive to be preconditions to payment.
Id. at 699. See also James E. Utterback, Substituting an Iron Fist for the Invisible Hand:
The False Claims Act and Nursing Home Quality of Care—A Legal and Economic Perspective,
10 Quinnipiac Health L.J. 113 (2007).
119 See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 698; 703 (acknowledging that a worthless services claim is valid
under the FCA, but limiting the use of the implied false certification theory to cases
where the “underlying statute or regulation upon which the plaintiff relies expressly
states” that the contractor must comply to get paid).
120 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); 3731(b)(1)–(2) (2004). See Krause, Healthcare Fraud and
Quality of Care.
121 Nat’l Consumer Prot. Technical Res. Ctr., Health Care Cases Comprise Bulk of DOJ’s Record
Amount Recoveries in Fiscal 2006, 10 Health Care Fraud Rep. 870 (Dec. 6, 2006), available at
http://ndcpd.misu.nodak.edu/smp/pdf/Clippings1128.pdf;
2008 Year-End False Claims Act Update (Jan. 1, 2009), available at
www.boardmember.com/Article_Details.aspx?id=2569. FCA settlements for allegations of healthcare fraud have resulted in single payments up to $875 million dollars.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., and Seven Others
Charged with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to Settle
Charges (Oct. 3, 2001), available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/513civ.htm.
122 See Wagonhurst et al., The Quality of Care Cerberus, at *3, n. 19, citing OIG’s Morris
Tells AHLA to Watch for Increases in False Claims Act Cases, 10 BNA Health Care Fraud
Rep. 524 (July 5, 2006) (Lewis Morris, Counsel to the U.S. DHHS OIG, explaining OIG’s
focus on using the FCA to “combat quality of care violations in hospitals and nursing
homes.”). For example, in U.S. v. United Mem’l Hosp., the hospital entered into a federal
plea agreement admitting overutilization of pain management surgical procedures
and inadequate credentialing of a practicing physician. Plea Agreement, Docket No.
1-CR-238 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2003). Two years before Tenet entered into the 2005 CIA
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issued compliance guidance for nursing homes. Noting that quality of
care is one basis for lack of compliance, the guidance enumerated nine
grounds of poor quality that could lead to an enforcement action:123
1. absence of a comprehensive assessment of each resident’s functional capacity and a responsive care plan;
2. inappropriate or insufficient treatment to address residents’
clinical conditions, including pressure ulcers, dehydration, malnutrition, incontinence of the bladder, and mental or psychosocial
problems;
3. failure to accommodate
preferences;

individual

resident

needs

and

4. failure to properly prescribe, administer, and monitor prescription
drug usage;
5. inadequate staffing levels or insufficiently trained or supervised
staff to provide medical, nursing, and related services;
6. failure to provide appropriate therapy services;
7. failure to provide appropriate services to assist residents with activities of daily living (e.g., feeding, dressing, bathing, etc.);
8. failure to provide an ongoing activities program to meet the individual needs of all residents; and
9. failure to report incidents of mistreatment, neglect, or abuse to the
administrator of the facility and other officials as required by law.
The recent proliferation of healthcare and pharmaceutical Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs) and Deferred Prosecution
Agreements (DPAs) reflects the federal government’s escalating com-

resolving liability for conduct including DRG upcoding, improper outlier payments,
kickbacks to physicians, and other fraudulent activities (discussed below), it settled
allegations of lack of medical necessity involving surgeries at one its hospitals. See
Press Release, OIG, OIG and Tenet Healthcare Corporation Reach Divestiture Agreement to Address Exclusion of Redding Medical Center (Dec. 11, 2003), available at
www.oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/press/2003/121103release.pdf. Tenet paid
$54 million in federal fines and agreed to divest Redding Medical Center, which was
accused of inadequate credentialing of cardiologists who conducted unnecessary
invasive heart procedures.
123 Publication of the OIG Compliance Program for Nursing Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 52, at
14,289 (Mar. 16, 2000), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/cpgnf.pdf
[hereinafter Publication of the OIG Compliance Program for Nursing Facilities]. In identifying potential risks for fraud and abuse, the OIG Supplemental Compliance Program for
Nursing Facilities issued in 2008 listed quality of care first, again providing in-depth
guidance about common areas of risk for poor quality. OIG Supplemental Compliance
Program Guidance for Nursing Facilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 190 at 56,832 (Sept. 30, 2008), available at www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/nhg_fr.pdf [hereinafter OIG
Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing Facilities].
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pliance scrutiny.124 The agreements with hospitals, pharmaceutical
companies, and other healthcare entities have clear implications for
board leadership.125 Specifically, CIAs and DPAs have delineated the
expectations and roles of the board and identified detailed oversight
remedies.126 Recent CIAs all set forth core requirements for the entities’ boards of directors, including the responsibility to oversee and
certify that the corporation is in compliance with the agreement and
federal law.127
While most CIAs address financial issues, prominent settlements
have focused on healthcare quality. In 2001, Vencor, one of the nation’s
largest operators of nursing homes and long-term hospital services,
was accused of submitting false claims to Medicare, Medicaid, and
TRICARE, the military’s healthcare program, based on poor quality
124 Commentators have predicted that the number of quality-based enforcement actions
will continue to increase. Carl Jean-Baptiste, Dropping the “Boom” on Healthcare,
Md. B.J. 32, 36 (Jan./Feb. 2009).
125 See November 2008 CIA with Bayer Corporation, which includes “specific requirements for the board of directors and management that will enable the OIG to closely
monitor company practices affecting Federal health care programs and beneficiaries.”
Press Release, U.S. D.O.J., Bayer Healthcare to Pay U.S. $97.5 Million to Settle
Allegations of Paying Kickbacks to Diabetic Suppliers (Nov. 25, 2008), available at
www.usdoj.gov/usao/fls/PressReleases/081125-01.html. In January 2009, Eli Lilly
& Co. entered into a five-year CIA with the OIG as part of a $1.4 billion settlement,
with similar requirements. Press Release, U.S. D.O.J., Eli Lilly & Co. Corporate Integrity
Agreement (Jan. 14, 2009), available at www.usdoj.gov/civil/ocl/cases/Cases/Eli_Lilly/
Corporate%20Integrity%20Agreement%20Eli%20Lilly.pdf.
126 Healthcare organizations and other entities enter into CIAs with the OIG (or DPAs
with the U.S. Attorney’s Office) to settle investigations arising out of false claims
and other legal violations. Some commentators assert that DPAs permit the federal
government to take an intrusive role in “policing, and supervising, corporate America.”
See Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in
Deferred Prosecution Agreements; 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2008); Kathleen Boozang &
Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, Am. J. L. Med. (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Boozang &
Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate Corruption].
127 According to the OIG website, the most comprehensive CIAs have certain elements
in common, such as the requirement to implement a comprehensive employee
training program and provide an implementation report and annual reports to the
OIG on the status of the entity’s compliance activities. U.S. H.H.S. O.I.G., Corporate
Integrity Agreements, available at www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.asp. They also include
specific requirements for board action, such as the requirement to hire a compliance
officer or appoint a compliance committee, to establish a quality assurance
monitoring committee as part of the board of directors, and to develop written
standards and policies. For example, the Green Valley Pavilion CIA, discussed below,
requires that “the Board of Directors may determine to appoint itself or a committee
of its members to serve as the [Compliance] Committee.” Corporate Integrity
Agreement Between the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health
and Human Services and Green Valley Pavilion et al. 3 (May 2007), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/green_valley_pavilion_05012007.pdf
[hereinafter Green Valley Pavilion CIA]. However, CIAs are tailored to the particular
circumstances of misconduct. A list of all CIAs, CCAs, and Settlement Agreements
with Integrity Provisions for healthcare providers and entities is available at
www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/cia_list.asp. As of February 2009, the site listed
480 entities with whom the OIG has entered into such agreements since 2000,
including hospitals and nursing homes.
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of care and failure to staff its facilities adequately.128 The company
entered a five-year CIA mandating a comprehensive quality assurance
infrastructure at the corporate, regional, and facility levels. The CIA
required quality committees to collect and review quality-related data to
identify problems, determine the root cause of the problems, develop
corrective action plans to improve care, and monitor the effectiveness
of the interventions to ensure overall improvement in the quality of
care and services delivered.
The September 2006 CIA with Tenet Healthcare Corporation was
a watershed agreement because of the broad sweep of provisions
directing board conduct to oversee quality of care.129 The five-year CIA
required the Quality, Compliance, and Ethics Committee of the board
to review the effectiveness of Tenet’s compliance program and adopt
resolutions summarizing its review of the company’s compliance with
the CIA and federal healthcare program requirements. The Tenet officers were required to certify the Medical Center’s compliance with the
CIA and submit annual reports to the OIG.130 In addition, the CIA
required an independent entity to assess (1) Tenet’s compliance with
its written policies and procedures to achieve compliance with federal
healthcare program requirements, and (2) the “effectiveness, reliability, and thoroughness of Tenet’s quality management infrastructure
and systems throughout Tenet.”131
In 2007, the OIG charged that Green Valley Pavilion, operated by the
Green Acres Health System, had forged and altered patient charts to maximize reimbursement from Delaware’s Medicaid Program. The Health
System entered into a four-year CIA requiring creation of a board Quality
Assurance Compliance Committee to address allegations of neglect and
poor quality of care. The CIA also mandated a board Quality Assurance
128 HHS and DOJ Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program Annual Report for FY 2001
(April 2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/HCFAC%20
Annual%20Report%20FY%202001.htm.
129 Press Release, Office of Inspector Gen., OIG Executes Tenet Corporate Integrity Agreement: Unprecedented Provisions Include Board of Directors Review (Aug. 28, 2006),
available at www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/press/Tenet%20CIA%20press%20release.pdf.
The full Tenet CIA is available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/TenetCIAFinal.pdf [hereinafter Tenet CIA].
See also D. Scott Jones, Combining Disciplines: Making the Connection Between Compliance, Risk, and Quality Management, 9 J. Health Care Compliance 5 (2007) (noting that 23
of the documents’ 63 pages address or name quality issues to some degree). In regard
to quality, the Tenet CIA required establishment of a clinical quality department,
including a chief medical officer, senior officers, and clinical quality staff; clinical audits;
physician credentialing; physician privileging; physician peer review; evidence-based
medicine programs; standards of clinical excellence; utilization management and
review; quality metrics; and other quality improvement measures.
130 Id. The 2005 CIA with HealthSouth also contained provisions requiring board of
director oversight, but the CIA is not as far-reaching as the Tenet CIA in outlining the
requirements. HealthSouth Corporate Integrity Agreement (Jan. 1, 2005), available at
ww.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/healthsouth_corporation_01012005.pdf/.
131 Tenet CIA, at 60–64; Gosfield & Reinertsen, Avoiding Quality Fraud.
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Monitoring Committee to “review the adequacy of Green Acres’ system
of internal controls, quality assurance monitoring, and patient care.”132
Finally, the CIA required a nurse consultant/monitor to inspect Green
Valley Pavilion (and five other facilities owned by Green Valley Pavilion’s
parent company) and report to Green Acres and the OIG on the facilities’ compliance with applicable regulations and standards of care.133
A more recent CIA entered into by Corona Care Convalescent
Corporation obliged the organization to create a board committee to
oversee the quality of care.134 This committee is required to:
•

review the adequacy of [Corona]’s system of internal controls, quality assurance monitoring, and patient care;

•

ensure that [Corona]’s response to state, federal,
internal, and external reports of quality of care issues
is complete, thorough, and resolves the issue(s) identified; and

•

[make sure] that [Corona] adopts and implements
policies and procedures [ ] designed to [provide] each
individual [with] the highest practicable physical,
mental, and psychosocial level of care attainable.135
The board committee must be readily available to the compliance
officer and the independent monitor. As under the Green Valley CIA,
the monitor is responsible for assessing the effectiveness of the Corona
Care internal quality control system and the facility’s response to quality of care issues, and for reporting to Corona Care and the OIG on the
facility’s compliance with regulations and standards of care.
Outside the quality arena, CIAs and DPAs entered into for violation
of federal and state laws demonstrate both the breadth of remedies that
government may demand in relation to boards of directors and the
concomitant loss of board authority over governance and operations.136
For example, in 2005, the University of Medicine and Dentistry of
132 Green Valley Pavilion CIA.
133 Press Release, Del. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Joseph R. Biden, III, Joins
the United States Attorney for the District of Delaware to Announce a Settlement
in a Fraudulent Medicaid Billing Scheme as Part of Agreement, Green Valley
Pavilion, LLC will Make Financial Payments and be Subject to Ongoing
Compliance Inspections (May 10, 2007), available at
http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/media/releases/2007/mfsettlement.shtml.
134 Corporate Integrity Agreement Between the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services and Corona Care Convalescent Corporation 4
(Mar. 31, 2008) www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/corona_care_convalescent_
corporation_03212008.pdf.
135 Id.
136 For a discussion of the trend in CIAs and DPAs, as well as the breadth of remedies
incorporated into the agreements, see Boozang & Handler-Hutchinson,
“Monitoring” Corporate Corruption.
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New Jersey (UMDNJ) entered into a DPA for violation of the anti-kickback law, hiring practices that favored those with political connections,
and other matters.137 The DPA required appointment of a federal monitor with substantial authority to conduct ongoing investigations. The
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey appointed a federal
monitor to oversee the activities of the leadership (board, CEO, and
senior medical staff), including governance procedures and structures,
cost reporting and billing, and conflicts of interest.138 When the monitor was eventually released, the board had been reconstituted from six
members to a more diverse eighteen, and the CEO, general counsel,
and chief compliance officer had all been replaced, with input from
the monitor.

Mounting federal expectations for boards
Heightened federal and state enforcement for poor quality of care
has occurred amidst rising standards for board oversight of corporate
compliance and financial management. Issued in 1991, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (the Sentencing Guidelines) was one
of the earliest federal statements to underscore board obligations to
prevent corporate misconduct.139 Applicable to nonprofit as well as forprofit corporations, the Sentencing Guidelines expressly recognize that
an effective compliance and ethics program can mitigate the sentence
for a corporation. Setting forth principles that may undergird future
government compliance guidance and enforcement action, the Guidelines stress that a necessary element of a compliance program is a board
that is knowledgeable about the organization’s compliance program
and exercises reasonable oversight of the program’s effectiveness.
In 2006, the Department of Justice amplified the importance of
board conduct in prosecutorial decisions about corporate culpability in a memorandum by Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty

137 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, available at
www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/UMDNJFINALDPA.pdf. The website
of the federal monitor is www.umdnj.edu/ethweb/federalmonitor. See also DPA
between DOJ and Bristol-Myers Squibb Corporation (2005), available at
www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/deferredpros.pdf (CEO replaced and
board required to provide detailed reporting to monitor for conspiring to commit
securities fraud); Press Release, Bristol-Myers Squibb Announces Agreement in
Principle to Resolve Federal Antitrust Investigation, available at
www.bms.com/News/press_releases/pages/default.aspx.
138 Vasilios J. Kalogredis, N.J. University and Hospital Released from Monitorship, 237 Legal
Intelligencer 45 (2008). UMDNJ was required to adopt the monitor’s recommendations
for improvement unless the U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed with UMDNJ that such a
recommendation should not be adopted.
139 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1992). The 2001 guidelines, which adopt the 1991
guidelines, are available at www.ussc.gov/2001guid/CHAP8.pdf.
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(the McNulty Memorandum).140 The McNulty Memorandum advised
prosecutors that in deciding about charges against a corporation and
penalties, they should take into account certain enumerated factors,
including the pervasiveness and history of the problem, and the corporation’s pre-existing compliance program.141 Citing the Caremark
decision, the McNulty Memorandum turned to the role of the board,
advising that prosecutors can take into account:
1. governance practices to identify wrongdoing;
2. whether board members exercise independent judgment in
reviewing transactions;
3. whether they receive sufficient information to do so; and
4. whether the directors have established an information and
reporting system reasonably designed to provide the board with
timely and accurate information to make an informed judgment
about legal compliance.142
In February 1998, OIG issued its Compliance Guidance for Hospitals,
setting forth expectations for the goals and operation of an effective compliance program and enumerating the basic elements of any
such program.143 The Compliance Guidance for Hospitals underscored
the importance of culture and leadership for compliance, with specific guidelines for boards. At the outset, the Compliance Guidance for
Hospitals noted, “The OIG believes that every effective compliance
program must begin with a formal commitment by the hospital’s governing body to include all of the applicable elements . . . .”144 Among
140 Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. The McNulty Memorandum superseded a
memorandum by Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson that had set forth similar
guidelines about consideration of board leadership and the adequacy of a compliance
program in determining penalties. Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan.
20, 2003), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm.
141 While recognizing that the existence of a corporate compliance program is not
sufficient by itself to justify a decision not to charge the corporation with criminal
conduct, the memorandum stated that an active, well-designed program—or its
absence—could play a role in prosecutorial decisions. Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, at 4
(Dec. 12, 2006), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
142 Id. at 14.
143 Publication of the OIG Compliance Program for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 35 at 8,987
(Feb. 23, 1998), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/cpghosp.pdf.
144 Id. at 8,989. The seven elements cited were: (1) written standards of conduct as well
as policies and procedures to promote compliance; (2) a Chief Compliance Officer
charged to operate the compliance program who reports to the CEO and Board of
Directors; (3) training programs for all employees; (4) a process to receive complaints;
(5) a system to respond to allegations of wrongdoing and disciplinary action against
employees who violate compliance policies or federal or state law; (6) audits or other
methods to monitor compliance; and (7) investigation and remediation of identified
systemic problems and policies addressing sanctioned individuals. These same basic
elements were set forth in the Compliance Guidance for Nursing Homes. Publication of
the OIG Compliance Program for Nursing Facilities, at 14,289.
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the elements cited is the designation of a Chief Compliance Officer
who reports directly to the CEO and the governing body. The document also highlights the importance of accountability, asserting that
the evaluation of managers and supervisors should include their performance in promoting and adhering to compliance. Two years later,
the OIG issued the Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing Facilities,
reiterating the importance of the board’s role and the need for direct
reporting about compliance to the board.145 Updated revised compliance guidance statements were issued for hospitals and nursing homes
in 2005 and 2008, respectively. Notably, both statements emphasize
that, among other benefits, implementation of a voluntary compliance
program “may significantly reduce the risk of unlawful conduct and
corresponding sanctions.”146
Adopted in 2002 in the aftermath of corporate scandals such as
Enron, Worldcom, and Arthur Anderson, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
sought to create more stringent standards for board accountability for
financial management. While Sarbanes-Oxley applies only to public
companies, it carried over into the nonprofit arena, establishing expectations for best practices, although not for legally mandated change.147
Among other actions, Sarbanes-Oxley required boards to appoint
an independent audit committee, include financial expertise on the
board, train board members in financial literacy, and oversee the credentials and work of the auditing firm retained by the corporation.
Over recent years, the IRS has steadily increased both its focus and
standards for board governance of tax-exempt organizations.148 Central to tax-exempt status is the notion that the organization must serve
public and not private purposes. In 2002, the IRS issued final rules
prohibiting “excess benefit transactions” for those in a position to influence corporate decisions, including explicit guidance for a process to
145 Publication of the OIG Compliance Program for Nursing Facilities at 14,289.
146 OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals,
70 Fed. Reg. 19 at 4,858 (Jan. 31, 2005), available at
www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/012705HospSupplementalGuidance.pdf;
OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing Facilities, at 56,832.
147 The American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 742 (2002). For a detailed discussion of the implications for and impact
of Sarbanes-Oxley on nonprofit boards, See Robert T. Harper & Stephanie Schreiber,
Hospital Board of Directors—the Challenges of Being a Hospital Director–Fiduciary Duties,
Governance Issues and Board Composition, 13th Ann. Health Law Inst. (March 2007);
G. Troyer et al., Governance Issues for Nonprofit Healthcare Organizations and the
Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1 Ind. Health L. Rev 175 (2004).
148 IRS rules for tax exemption have broad and complex application to nonprofit entities,
with issues such as the requirement to provide community benefit that have particular salience for healthcare facilities. It has been argued that in recent years, the IRS
“has become the primary regulator of nonprofit behavior.” James Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 Md. L. Rev. 218, 265 (2003). See also Thomas Greaney,
New Governance Norms and Quality of Care in Nonprofit Hospitals, 14 Annals Health L.
421, 426 (2005) (“The IRS has long served as a de facto monitor of corporate governance in the nonprofit sector.”).
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set executive compensation that would create a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.149 In February 2008, noting the strong link
between good governance and tax law compliance, the IRS released a
detailed memorandum recommending good governance practices for
tax exempt organizations.150 The recommended practices cover significant ground, calling for, among other steps, an explicit statement of
mission, a clear framework for governance, independent board members, and written policies on conflicts of interest and protection for
whistleblowers. The emphasis on transparency and executive compensation was amplified by the release later in 2008 of the revised 990 tax
form for nonprofits, which significantly expanded disclosure of governance practices and executive compensation.151

Drafting a roadmap for boards: the OIG-AHLA Joint Statement and
the NQF guide
The most explicit federal guidance about board fiduciary duties
on quality issued to date is set forth in a 2004 joint statement issued
by OIG and the American Health Lawyers Association (the Joint
Statement).152 Identified as an educational resource for boards, the
149 IRS Code § 4958.
150 Internal Revenue Service, Governance and Related Topics—501(c)(3) Organizations
(Feb. 4, 2008) available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance_practices.pdf.
In addition, the memorandum recommended written policies for fundraising, careful
review of financial audits, and written policies on document retention and destruction
to prevent improper behavior in the face of a government investigation.
151 IRS Code § 4958. Executive compensation has been a sustained area of focus
for the IRS. In 2007, it released the results of a study of executive compensation
by nonprofit entities, indicating significant problems with reporting of the
compensation on 990 tax forms. Report on Exempt Organizations Executive
Compensation Compliance Projects Parts I and II (March 2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/exec._comp._final.pdf. In August 2008, the IRS
finalized the new Form 990, which requires, for the first time, reporting on specific
board governance practices such as board composition and transparency, in
addition to seeking more information about executive compensation. The
2008 Form 990 is available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf.
152 OIG & AHLA, Corporate Responsibility and Health Care Quality: A Resource for Health
Care Boards of Directors (2007), available at www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
complianceguidance/CorporateResponsibilityFinal%209-4-07.pdf. This is the third
in a series of joint statements by the two organizations. The earlier two provided
guidance to boards on overseeing corporate compliance, and to general counsel on
promoting compliance. The OIG & AHLA, Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Compliance:
A Resource for Health Care Boards of Directors (2003), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/040203CorpRespRsceGuide.pdf;
The OIG & AHLA, An Integrated Approach to Corporate Compliance: A Resource for Health
Care Organization Boards of Directors, (2004), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/Tab%204E%20Appendx-Final.
pdf. See also Driving for Quality in Long-Term Care: A Board of Directors Dashboard,
Government-Industry Roundtable, a joint statement by the OIG and the Health Care
Compliance Association Roundtable on Long-Term Care Board of Directors’ Oversight
of Quality of Care, laying out guidance for nursing home boards of directors. The
advice echoed many of the recommendations in the Joint Statement for hospital
boards, noting additional sources of information boards should consider, including
resident complaints and family, resident, and staff satisfaction surveys.
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Joint Statement sets forth proactive best practices by boards. It does
not specify grounds for enforcement in terms of poor or prohibited conduct.153 Nonetheless, the actions recommended in the Joint
Statement may inform federal and state prosecutors as they weigh
enforcement decisions. The Joint Statement recognizes the heightened
focus on quality and concomitant heightened expectations for boards,
“[w]ith a new era of focus on quality and patient safety rapidly emerging, oversight of quality also is becoming more clearly recognized as a
core fiduciary responsibility of health care organization directors.”154
At the outset, the Joint Statement summarizes board fiduciary duties
for quality, asserting that boards are responsible for overseeing patient
safety and healthcare quality. The Joint Statement urges that as attention is increasing on quality of care, boards adjust their practices to
be responsive to a changing national environment.155 In addition, the
Joint Statement stresses that quality has emerged as an enforcement
priority for federal and state regulators. Accordingly, it advises boards
to seek regular reports about compliance risks posed by poor quality,
and about the organization’s system to minimize and monitor these
risks. The Joint Statement points to new financial arrangements at the
intersection of quality and compliance that require oversight, including pay-for-performance, gainsharing, and outcomes management.156
The core of the Joint Statement is a series of questions designed to
shape the board’s duties in overseeing healthcare quality. The questions guide a board’s inquiry into the design and implementation
of the organization’s program on patient safety and quality, and the
means to fulfill the board’s oversight obligation. The questions cover
the following issues:
1. the goals for quality and the measures to assess those goals;
2. the means to improve patient care and quality, and accountability among key management and clinical staff for process and
outcomes;

153 The Joint Statement lacks the weight of regulation, an opinion letter, or a formal
guidance statement. Referring to the questions delineated to inform board inquiry
in overseeing quality, the Joint Statement asserts that the questions raised in the
document “are not intended to set forth any specific standards of care ….” OIG &
AHLA, Corporate Responsibility and Health Care Quality: A Resource for Health Care Boards of
Directors at 1 (2007), available at www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/
CorporateResponsibilityFinal%209-4-07.pdf.
154 Id. at 1. The Joint Statement notes that the heightened focus on quality “increasingly
impacts the responsibilities of corporate directors.” The Joint Statement implicitly recognizes that board oversight of healthcare quality has not been central to the board
duties of care and obedience.
155 Id. at 4.
156 Id. at 3.
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3. operational policies and practices to support and monitor quality of care;
4. the board’s own competence to oversee quality, focusing on
board training and expertise;
5. the information essential to the board to oversee quality, and a
timetable for reports to the board;
6. coordination between the corporate compliance program and
patient safety, and integration of quality concerns into corrective action plans;
7. mechanisms to foster internal reports of quality problems;
8. the allocation of resources for quality improvement and patient
safety;
9. the alignment of medical staff credentialing standards and peer
review with the organization’s quality goals and measures; and
10. the response to adverse events both by the organization and
by the board, so that the events are identified, analyzed, and
addressed effectively.
In relation to this last goal, the Joint Statement notes the growing
body of data that can point to patient safety concerns, including hospital quality data reported to CMS, adverse events reported to many state
governments, and peer review reporting conducted in accord with the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act.157
In 2004, the National Quality Forum (NQF) also released a guide
for hospital boards of directors on fiduciary duties to oversee quality
and patient safety.158 Hospital Governing Boards and Quality of Care: A Call
to Responsibility begins with the statement that “board members often
express confusion and uncertainty about what exactly they need to
do to fulfill their responsibilities” to oversee healthcare quality.159 The
NQF guide urges board engagement in many of the oversight actions
proposed by the Joint Statement, with some additional guidance. The
guide emphasizes that hospital governing boards must develop “quality literacy,” including familiarity with the structures in place to support
patient safety, quality improvement, and measurement. It also under157 Id. at 11. While recognizing that these sources of data are a resource to the board,
the Joint Statement cautions boards to seek legal counsel about the confidentiality
protection accorded some of the information, and to proceed in a way that does not
unnecessarily increase the organization’s exposure to liability.
158 Nat’l Quality Forum, Hospital Governing Boards and Quality of Care: A Call to Responsibility
(Dec. 2004), available at www.qualityforum.org/pdf/reports/call_to_responsibility.pdf.
The recommendations in the document were prepared with input from experts in
board fiduciary duties, healthcare measurement and quality, hospital leadership,
and consumer organizations.
159 Id. at 1.
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scores the board’s role in following up on poor performance on quality
or safety measures, and the value of incentives for hospital executives
to advance high performance.

The Role of Health Systems on Healthcare Quality
In general, a board of director’s statutory obligation to oversee
quality and common law fiduciary duties of care and mission are nondelegable. Thus, parent boards of a health system of hospitals, nursing
homes, and other entities that deliver healthcare services cannot supplant the boards of the facilities in overseeing quality. In some states,
parent boards can share this responsibility with the entity board, subject to the express approval of state public health authorities.160 While
health system boards in general do not assume direct responsibility
for overseeing quality of care, it is conceivable that they could be
held accountable for poor quality if they exercise corporate authority
to interfere with the subsidiary entities’ efforts to improve quality or
address quality-related compliance risks.161
Some health systems have adopted mirror boards for parent and
(one or all) subsidiary entities, establishing that the parent and subsidiaries have the same members on the boards of directors. In this
governance model, the parent and subsidiary entities do not share
responsibility for healthcare quality. The board of the facility, observing
corporate formalities of separate meetings, minutes and resolutions,
oversees quality at the facility.162 While this model of corporate governance reduces conflict between entities within the system, streamlines
the number of meetings, and centralizes control, it presents serious
challenges to a board in fulfilling its duties to oversee matters as complex and demanding as finance, quality, and compliance for numerous
entities throughout the health system.163
160 For example, in New York state, hospitals can delegate or share operating authority
with a parent entity if that entity has applied for and received state approval to serve
in effect as a co-operator of the facility under Article 28 of the Public Health Law. In
this process, proposed certificates of incorporation and bylaws for the parent entity
and subsidiary facility must delineate the respective responsibilities for the entities on
healthcare quality and other areas of operation.
161 For example, if the parent entity demanded budget cuts that reduced staffing to a
level that created risks to patient safety, or insisted on policies that led to poor care,
state public health authorities might seek to hold the entity accountable.
162 In some states, such as New York, the health system board can share responsibility
for healthcare quality, subject to the governance documents and state approval.
See Edward Kornreich, Corporate Governance Issues Faced by Orchard Health,
9 Health Law J. 20, 22 (2004).
163 However, as found in a recent study, boards of health systems are more likely than hospital boards to have a separate committee on quality, which could undertake oversight
of numerous entities. J. Jiang et al., Board Engagement in Quality: Findings of a Survey of
Hospital and System Leaders, 53 J. Healthcare Mgmt. 121 (2008) [hereinafter Jiang et al.,
Board Engagement in Quality].
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Expertise and leadership on quality will vary from institution to
institution in any health system. Although health system boards do not
have direct responsibility for quality of care, they can play an important
role in improving quality by providing expertise, setting benchmarks
for performance, and holding the subsidiary boards accountable for
high performance on quality.164 The health system can offer training
and protocols to enhance quality, and establish system-wide quality
improvement initiatives and goals. Like the subsidiary boards, the
health system board can contribute to a culture that values and recognizes high performance on quality.

Board Engagement on Quality: What the Data Show
Several recent studies provide insight into the level of board involvement, specific activities boards undertake, and the attributes of board
activity associated with higher-performing hospitals.165 Overall, the
data show a high level of board involvement in terms of review of quality measures and setting goals on quality, with more equivocal findings
on board effectiveness as evaluated by chief executive officers.
Board time devoted to quality varies widely, ranging from less than
five percent to more than twenty-five percent.166 Most hospital and health
system boards use quality dashboards to review quality performance, and
most dashboards include the CMS Quality Compare Measures. There is
wide variation, however, in how boards and institution-based leaders use
the dashboards.167 Health system boards are more likely than hospital
boards to use quality dashboards, to incorporate national benchmarks
in those dashboards, and to have a committee of the board devoted to
quality.168
Hospitals or health systems where boards use dashboards with fewer
measures and review them more frequently perform better in terms of
quality of care.169 Board use of the dashboards for two years or longer
164 Many health systems may be doing so, given the preponderance of quality committees at the board health system level. Id. The health system’s role in quality for
subsidiary organizations should be delineated in its mission statement and corporate
documents.
165 Id.; T. Vaughn et al., Engagement of Leadership in Quality Improvement Initiatives:
Executive Quality Improvement Survey Results, 2 Patient Satisfaction 2 (2006) [hereinafter
Vaughn et al., Engagement of Leadership in Quality Improvement Initiatives]; E. Kroch et
al., Hospital Boards and Quality Dashboards, 2 Patient Safety 10 (2006) [hereinafter Kroch
et al., Hospital Boards and Quality Dashboards].
166 Vaughn et al., Engagement of Leadership in Quality Improvement Initiatives, at 3.
167 The study of 139 hospitals by Kroch et al. found that 87% of hospitals used a dashboard on quality; the study of 562 hospitals and health systems by Jiang et al. found a
virtually identical percent, 86.7.
168 Jiang et al., Board Engagement in Quality, at 129. 86% of health system boards have a
committee of the board devoted to quality vs. 58% of hospital boards.
169 Kroch et al, Hospital Boards and Quality Dashboards, at 18.
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is also associated with higher hospital performance on quality. In addition, the involvement of a board quality committee in developing the
content of the quality dashboard is associated with a significant difference in quality outcomes.170 One study examined the association
between the existence of a board committee devoted to quality of care
and other markers of board engagement on quality, concluding that
boards with a quality committee performed significantly better on all
measures of engagement; the boards were more likely to:
•

use quality dashboards (91% versus 79%);

•

set strategic goals for quality (89.5% versus 68.2%);

•

set the agenda for the board discussion on quality (48.8% versus
32.6%);

•

include measures of quality and patient safety in executive performance evaluation (61% versus 45%); and

•

issue a written policy on quality communicated throughout the
organization (34% versus 26%).171

Larger hospitals and those in the northeast were more likely than
smaller hospitals to have board quality committees.172
Another study that examined different potential correlates between
quality outcomes and quality leadership found that the following four
factors were associated with better outcomes:
1. facilities with boards that spend more than twenty-five percent
of board meeting time on quality;
2. a high level of interaction between board members and medical
staff leaders in setting the hospital’s quality agenda;
3. identification of the CEO or COO by hospital leaders as the
person with the “greatest impact” on quality; and
4. compensation of senior executives based in part on quality
improvement performance.173
Interestingly, the same study found a sharp difference in perception
between CEOs and chief medical officers (CMO)/quality improvement
(QI) executives about the most significant change that could improve
quality. CEOs were more likely to cite physician engagement as the
change factor. CMOs and QI executives ranked health information

170 As stated by the study authors, “Perhaps the most important finding of this study is that
hospitals in which the board quality committees are strongly involved with the development of the dashboard content had significantly higher performance ….” Id. at 16.
171 Jiang et al., Board Engagement in Quality, at 129.
172 Id. at 129.
173 Vaughn et al., Engagement of Leadership in Quality Improvement Initiatives, at 6.
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technology as more significant.174 In the one study that asked CEOs
about board performance on quality, less than half the CEOs rated the
board’s performance highly.175

Where Do Boards Go From Here?
Devised as a platform for improvement and pay-for-performance,
scientific advances in quality measurement and reporting have changed
both the tools and expectations for board oversight of healthcare
quality. A passive role for the board in reviewing credentialing decisions
has been replaced by an emerging paradigm of a board that is better
informed, better able to lead, and more accountable for quality of care.
Significantly, recent studies of board engagement on quality all suggest
that many hospital boards are actively undertaking quality oversight.176
As set forth in the roadmap laid out by the joint OIG-AHLA statement on board fiduciary duties, boards should undertake an array
of tasks ranging from regular review of quality measures, training to
understand the metrics for quality, creation of goals, and evaluation of
resources and staff assigned to quality of care. In the traditional governance model, board members often were recruited primarily for their
financial expertise and capacity to donate or raise funds. In the face of
far more data and rising expectations for board oversight of quality, it
is critical that boards evaluate their membership to determine if they
have the expertise and passion for quality to drive board engagement
and leadership. As suggested by the study by Kroch et al., boards that
have a quality committee perform better on all measures of engagement and leadership.177
Boards should understand the measures used across all three dimensions of quality and require a strategic plan for how the institution
will improve performance in each area, including accountability for
improvement among administrative and medical leadership. Boards
also should set priorities for patient safety and quality, in consultation
with executive and medical staff leadership. Public quality measures
provide key information for boards and must be part of an overall strategy for quality measurement and improvement. Boards should rely
upon serious adverse or never events and near misses, as well as assessment of quality concerns by the medical and nursing leadership, to
identify other areas for improvement. Priorities also should establish
174 Id. at 5.
175 The CEOs were asked to rate board performance on a scale of 1 to 6, with less than half
the boards receiving a score of 5 or 6. Jiang et al., Board Engagement in Quality, at 125.
176 See Kroch et al., Hospital Boards and Quality Dashboards; Jiang et al., Board Engagement
in Quality; Vaughn et al., Engagement of Leadership in Quality Improvement Initiatives.
177 Kroch et al., Hospital Boards and Quality Dashboards.
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priorities or maintain practice areas of excellence key to the institution’s reputation and brand.
Boards will need to evaluate where their institution stands on quality in a comparative sense, i.e., compared to the peer group for their
institution in terms of academic or community hospital, size, and/or
region. Boards should ask management for dashboards on quality that
present the information in an actionable, concise form, and should be
engaged in determining which measures are provided in the quality
dashboard. For serious adverse events, boards should take an active
role in seeking a corrective action plan and monitoring by appropriate
staff to prevent further similar incidents.
Finally, boards should seek data to evaluate risks and seek needed
improvement at the intersection of quality and compliance. With CMS
undertaking datamining to pursue and target investigations for poor
quality, boards should seek information that can be generated from
financial and care delivery databases to flag quality of care deficiencies that would trigger enforcement. To undertake the task, the board
should seek a coordinated approach from leadership in quality and
compliance.

Recommendations for Government Oversight
Comparative quality measures and public reporting give government new information and tools to oversee quality. While most states
have relied on periodic Joint Commission surveys and self-reporting
of serious adverse events to drive investigation of serious quality concerns, states can now use quality measures to identify facilities that
might have serious deficiencies in care. Measures of quality for medical
treatment and certain measures of patient satisfaction (such as those
that focus on adequate treatment for pain and acknowledgement of
a patient’s treatment choices) should be reviewed by government to
determine if patient care is so deficient that it places patients at risk.
State governments and the Joint Commission should reevaluate the
timing and nature of surveys in light of available quality data, giving
consideration to more targeted assessments that focus on either poorly
performing institutions or areas of care delivery where the data indicate poor care.178
At the state level, attorneys general have the most direct oversight
responsibility to oversee board performance in fulfilling their fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty, and mission. Unquestionably, quality is core to
178 See Donald M. Berwick & Troyen A. Brennan, New Rules: Regulation, Markets, and the
Quality of American Health Care 369 (1995).
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mission for healthcare institutions, and a state attorney general could
choose to reprimand or even replace a board of directors in an institution with severe, persistent quality problems that place patients at
risk. At the same time, attorneys general are not familiar with quality of care metrics or delivery, which fall under the oversight of state
health departments and CMS as payors and regulators of quality. For
this reason, oversight of board performance on quality should rest with
the agencies most able to carry out the responsibility.
The government’s approach to evaluation of board leadership
should follow a pattern similar to compliance; demonstration that the
board has focused on quality to provide leadership should be exculpatory or reduce the size of any penalty, while board failure to address
serious, persistent problems should be taken into account. The connection between leadership, quality, and culture is well recognized,
and boards should be held accountable for serious quality problems if
data available to the board suggest that the problem has persisted over
time without attempts to improve.

Conclusion
Legal doctrines enunciating board fiduciary duties, as well as state
statutes vesting ultimate oversight of the quality of care in the board
of directors, had little impact on the board’s role in improving patient
safety and quality throughout the twentieth century. As reflected in
the landmark report, To Err is Human, as well as in studies that preceded and followed it, serious medical errors leading to patient death
or injury routinely occurred in healthcare facilities. The legal doctrine
recognizing hospital responsibility for quality of care first handed
down in Darling v. Charleston in 1965, and the rising tide of malpractice
litigation that followed, did remarkably little to change the structure
and nature of leadership on quality within healthcare institutions.
Boards provided final approval for credentialing decisions, but mostly
deferred to the organized medical staff as the locus of control and
oversight of quality.179
Until recently, systemic barriers impeded quality improvement,
including the independence of the medical staff, the lack of reliable,
comparative measures of quality, the lack of transparency in quality,
and, most significantly, the absence of a business case for quality, with
179 John D. Blum, Feng Shui and the Restructuring of the Hospital Corporation: A Call for
Change in the Face of the Medical Error Epidemic, 14 Health-Matrix: J. L.-Med. 5 (2004);
Thomas Greaney, New Governance Norms and Quality of Care in Nonprofit Hospitals,
14 Annals Health L. 421, 422 (2005); Brian M. Peters & Jonathan Z. Cohen, Board Quality Oversight: A “Real World” Systemic Compliance Model, 14th Annual Health Law Inst.
(Mar. 2008).
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healthcare financial incentives misaligned to reward quality improvement. In many respects, public and private payors, frustrated by the
lack of national and institutional progress on quality, have driven the
quality agenda.
Medical staff control over quality rested in part on physicians’ exclusive access to information about the quality of care. With the movement
toward publicly reported measures, healthcare boards of directors are
no longer dependent on the medical staff for information about performance across all three dimensions of quality: patient safety, quality
improvement, and patient satisfaction. The expanding use of information systems, including the electronic medical record and bar coding
that generate significant databases on quality under administrative
control, add to institutional capacity to develop quality reports and
increase board access to information.
Courts have not held healthcare boards to a duty to investigate to
identify quality of care problems, recognizing that board members
could rely on the CEO and other senior officers to bring problems to
their attention, including poor quality of care. Once notified of a concern, however, boards are obligated to undertake an inquiry, inform
themselves about the problem, and seek corrective action.180 It can
be assumed that boards have notice of problems revealed in publicly
reported quality measures or publicly reported patient safety errors.
Where quality scores fall well below performance measures for institutions comparable in size, patient mix, and region, boards should
assume that the fiduciary duty to ask questions, seek an explanation,
and demand solutions has been triggered.
While quality always has been core to healthcare facilities’ mission,
financial incentives from public and private payors, transparency, and
potentially large financial penalties tied to compliance sanctions for
poor quality have changed the stakes for boards and their institutions.
Although facilities previously may have given quality of care initiatives
lower priority in the face of financial challenges and difficult choices
about investment of limited capital, pay-for-performance will make
quality integral to financial goals and revenue.
In the past, serious adverse events, when splashed across the headlines, had the potential to affect reputation on quality but were relatively
rare and, absent specific warning signs, unanticipated by the board. In
general, consumers continued to rely on word of mouth rather than

180 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l
Training School., 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D. D.C. 1974); In re Caremark Int’l. Inc. Deriv. Litig.,
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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quality data to select hospitals.181 However, years of experiments and
experience by business coalitions and national quality organizations
seeking to make quality measures salient and actionable by the public
may bear fruit. As suggested by one recent study, public measures
combined with public reporting that provides a summary score or recommendation may influence both reputation and consumer choice of
hospital.182 Reputation may now be tied to quality measures in a tangible way, with explicit data that can prompt board inquiry and action
to protect and promote the institution’s reputation.
Finally, heightened government enforcement of poor quality, combined with financial incentives for compliance recoveries under the
Deficit Reduction Act, create another powerful incentive for boards
to focus on patient safety. Federal and state enforcement has not only
raised the financial costs of poor compliance, but increased expectations for board oversight, with direct implications for board duties on
quality: enhanced board expertise and literacy, better reporting systems
to identify problems, and increased accountability of senior management for outcomes. At the same time, OIG compliance guidance and
Department of Justice Sentencing Guidelines make clear that board
performance in overseeing quality can have a direct impact on the
price paid by institutions—in prosecutors’ decisions about violations
and penalties.183
It has long been a truism that the board of directors has the ultimate
responsibility for the quality of care. The absence of reportable quality measures, immature information systems, and the independence
of medical staffs meant that the truism often was devoid of content.
Transparency in quality, comparative measures, and the rising stakes
for healthcare quality have given boards powerful new incentives and
new tools to lead on quality.

181 Judith H. Hibbard & Jacquelyn J. Jewett, Will Quality Report Cards Help Consumers?,
16 Health Aff. 218 (1997); Charles N. Kahn et al., Snapshot of Hospital Quality Reporting
and Pay-For-Performance Under Medicare,” 25 Health Aff. 148 (2006).
182 Judith H. Hibbard et al., It Isn’t Just about Choice: The Potential of a Public Performance
Report to Affect the Public Image of Hospitals, 62 Med. Care Res. & Rev. 358 (2005). The
study by Hibbard et al., suggests that consumers will use quality information for choice
if the information: (1) clearly identifies high and poor performers; (2) is concise; and
(3) is widely disseminated.
183 Publication of the OIG Compliance Program for Nursing Facilities, at 14,289
(listing grounds of poor quality that could lead to enforcement actions);
Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice. Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available at
www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
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